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WHEN ENOUGH IS NOT ENOUGH: CORRECTING MARKET
INEFFICIENCIES IN THE PURCHASE AND SALE OF
RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY INSURANCE
By Kenneth S. Klein*
ABSTRACT
Each year at least hundreds, and often thousands ofAmericans lose their
homes to natural disasters striking populated areas. Tens of thousands
lose their homes to single-instance fires, floods, or other catastrophes.
The majority of these homeowners are underinsured, meaning they have
less insurance than it will cost to rebuild their homes. This Article
analyzes whether such underinsurance indicates correctible
inefficiencies in the residential property insurance markets. The Article
identifies two inefficiencies: (1) Inadequate information, which impairs
informed pricing decisions by purchasers; and (2) Dispute costs (such as
litigation) in the instances of loss exceeding coverage. The Article
proposes addressing these inefficiencies by adopting a mandatory
disclosure, provided at the time of purchase or renewal of insurance
based on the EnergyGuide program labeling appliances for energy
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INTRODUCTION
Homeowners: if your home burned down tomorrow, would you have
enough insurance to rebuild? In the wake of natural disasters, one
recurring story is that a large number of Americans mistakenly answer
"yes," when the correct answer should be "no."' This Article analyzes
whether this situation indicates correctable market inefficiencies. 2 In the
1 See, e.g., Kelsey D. Dulin, The Disaster After the Disaster: Insurance
Companies' Post-Catastrophe Claims Handling Practices, 61 OKLA. L. REV.
189 (2008); Kathy Chu & Elizabeth Weise, Wildfires Spotlight Insurance
Coverage Issues, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 2007, at BI; Joseph B. Treaster,
Homeowners Come Up Short On Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2004, at Al;
David Lazarus, Underinsured Wildfire Victims Feel Burned Again When
Coverage Comes Up Short, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2008, at Cl; CBS Evening
News: Underinsurance with Allstate (CBS television broadcast July 14, 2008) (t
ranscript available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/14/eveningnews/
main4261407.shtml) (last visited June 22, 2009) [hereinafter CBS Evening
News]; Liz Pulliam Weston, The Basics: Why 2 Out of 3 Homes Are Underinsur
ed, MSN MONEY, Apr. 21, 2004, http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Insuranc
e/Insureyourhome/P35340.asphttp://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Insurance/I
nsureyourhome/P35340.asphttp://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Insurance/Insu
reyourhome/P35340.asp (last visited June 23, 2009); Cynthia Beisiegel,
Underinsured Homeowner Problem Revisited on Anniversary of California
Wildfires, INS. J., Nov. 8, 2004, at 21; Elliot Spagat, Homeowners Haunted by
Underinsurance, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, July 11, 2004, http://www.ufaa.com/N
ews Articles/haunted.htm.
2 Economics does not use the jargon of a working or failing market, but rather
classifies markets as efficient or inefficient. Inefficient markets are ones
unnecessarily burdened with external costs or risks, such as a cost or risk that
[Vol. 18:3346
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wake of natural disasters in populated areas, insurance companies can
incur billions of dollars of exposure on property claims,3 and
homeowners can incur hundreds of millions of dollars of uninsured
losses.4 Hurricane Katrina alone resulted in roughly 18 billion dollars of
insured losses. Across the United States in the single year of 2007,
41,000 homeowners lost their homes to disaster.6 That same year the
average home was worth roughly $191,500,7 and about 40% of those
homes were underinsured by an average of about 20%.' If all 41,000
homes lost to disaster were insured, then even assuming the cost to
rebuild is the same-and not more than the appraised market value of a
home, a more realistic assumption-$628,120,000 in uncovered disaster
losses to insured homes occurred in a single year. The October and
November 2007 Southern California firestorms alone resulted in 1732
could be eliminated with a solution costing less than the cost or risk itself, or a
transactional cost or risk allocated to a party inadequately apprised of the
allocation and thus without a reasonable opportunity to account for the cost or
risk when negotiating the transaction price. See, e.g., Inefficient Market
Definition, THE FREE DICTIONARY, http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.
com/Inefficient+Market ("A market where prices do not always reflect available
information as accurately as possible. Inefficient markets may result from a lag
in information transferring to one place to another, deliberate withholding of
information by an insider, or other reasons."); accord Freeman v. Laventhal &
Horwath, 915 F.2d 193, 198 (6th Cir. 1990) ("An inefficient market, by
definition, does not incorporate into its price all the available information about
the value of a security.") (citing Lipton v. Documation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740, 746
(11th Cir. 1984); Reingold v. Deloitte Haskins & Sells, 599 F. Supp. 1241, 1264
(S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
3 See, e.g., Howard Kunreuther, Linking Insurance and Mitigation to Manage
Natural Disaster Risk, printed in GEORGES DIONNE, HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE
593-618 (Kluwer 2000); see also Kathy Bushouse, What Wrecked Property
Insurance?, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 2007, http://insurancenewsnet.com/
article.aspx?a=toppc&id=74304 ("the 2004 and 2005 hurricane seasons that
caused $35.9 billion in insured losses"); Insurance Services Office, ISO's PPC
Program, at 1 (2001) (fire is "the largest single cause of property loss in the
United States," causing "direct losses of more than $120 billion and countless
billions more in related costs").
4 See Chu & Weise, supra note 1; Lazarus, supra note 1; Treaster, supra note 1;
CBS Evening News, supra note 1; CAL. DEP'T OF INS., ESTIMATE OF SUMMARY
Loss DATA RESULTING FROM THE NOVEMBER 2008 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
FIRES, Data as of May 10, 2009.
5 E-mail from Gary Kerney, Assistant Vice President of Property Claims Servs.,
Insurance Services Office, to Jihan Younis (June 16, 2009) (on file with author).
6 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES:
2007, tbl.3-11 [hereinafter 2007 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.3-1 1].
7 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES:
2007, tbl.1A-7 [hereinafter 2007 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.1A-7].
PETER M. WELLS, INSURING TO VALUE: MEETING A CRITICAL NEED 46 (2d ed.
2007).
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total loss residential claims.9 A six-month after-the-fact survey of the
subset of homeowners who lost their homes to the October 2007
wildfires in San Diego reported the average amount of underinsurance at
$240,000.10
Based on data such as this, the media assumes and asserts that the
insurance market is somehow "broken" -- a colloquial, intuitive
conclusion that the expected market mechanisms have failed in an
unspecified manner." But an efficient transaction occurs when a rational,
adequately informed 2 buyer and seller agree to a particular level of
insurance coverage at a particular price, in an arms-length negotiation,
even without regard to later financial consequences for one party or the
9 CAL. DEP'TOF INS., ESTIMATE OF SUMMARY Loss DATA RESULTING FROM THE
OCTOBER AND NOVEMBER 2007 SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA FIRES, Data as of
December 20, 2008. This surely resulted in some homeowners never being able
to rebuild. For insurers, the likely consequences are less severe. Insurance
Services Office, Managing Catastrophe Risk, May 1996, at 4 ("Large
catastrophes are rare; therefore, an insurer that does not have high catastrophe
limits is likely to survive."). Perhaps in recognition of the disparate impact of
underinsurance on homeowners and insurers, industry spokespersons may
minimize the frequency of underinsurance. Lazarus, supra note 1 ("It happens,
but it doesn't happen as often as you might see in the media.").
ioUNITED POLICYHOLDERS, http://www.uphelp.org/library/resource/southern-
california-wildfire-claim-survey-results (last visited Apr. 14, 2011). The
complete data set is on file with the author. Obviously, the value of these homes
was substantially above the national average.
11 See, e.g., Bushouse, supra note 3 ("legislators prepare to plunge into debate
on the best ways to repair the broken insurance market"). During the debate in
2009 and 2010 over comprehensive health care reform, politicians and
commentators also adopted the jargon of a "broken insurance market" to convey
the concept of perceived complex structural market failures. See, e.g., Letter
from Health Care for America Now to Christine Varney, Assistant Attorney
Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (May 19, 2009) available at
http://hcfan.3cdn.net/60de4bc8c6929815dcurm6bhu9z.pdf ("HCAN believes
that it would be a mistake to rely solely on this broken insurance market to
generate increased value in our health care system."); David Dayen, Obama
Administration Trying to Stop Degrading of Employer-Based Healthcare,
FIREDOG LAKE (June 14, 2010, 1:21 PM), http://news.firedoglake.com/2010/06/
14/obama-administration-trying-to-stop-degrading-of-employer-based-health-
care ("[C]osts for employers, among the more stable in the broken insurance
market, are expected to jump 9% in 2011 . . . ."); Tevi Troy, A Fixed Insurance
Market Is Still a Broken Insurance Market, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, Feb. 22, 2010,
http://www.nationalreview.com/critical-condition/47584/fixed-insurance-
market-still-broken-insurance-market/tevi-troy.
12 The terminology "adequately informed" recognizes that the law may impose a
limitation or allocation of risk through contractual disclosures that are not "full"
or "perfect." See generally Mark Geistfeld, The Political Economy of
Neocontractual Proposals for Products Liability Reform, 72 TEx. L. REV. 803
(1994).
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other.13 "Underinsurance"-instances when the amount of coverage is
less than the insurable value of the home-does not, in and of itself,
indicate market inefficiency; for example, a rational homeowner who has
adequate information concerning home value and the cost of insurance
and who has a very remote likelihood of a significant loss might
intentionally and efficiently purchase less than full insurance.
This Article will step away from the ex post facto accusations and
pejorative characterizations surrounding insurance and underinsurance in
the wake of mass loss, and analyze the market for actual inefficiencies
susceptible to reform.14 This Article concludes that the structure of
residential insurance markets gives an incentive to undervalue the cost of
rebuilding a home, and that insurance policies mask both the possibility
of undervaluation and the allocation between homeowner and insurer of
the risk of undervaluation. Simply put, many homeowners do not know
how much it would cost to rebuild their homes, do not know that they
are underinsuring their homes, and do not know that if they lose their
homes, courts may say that their lack of insurance is their own fault. The
result is confusion in the pricing of coverage, and litigation in the event
of loss. These are, broadly speaking, market inefficiencies resulting from
inadequacy of information.
In seeking to address these inefficiencies, this Article builds on the
work of Professors Daniel Schwarcz and Jeffrey Stempel, who argue that
insurance may be more properly thought of as a product, rather than a
contract.15 This Article applies that approach to residential property
insurance as a means to address the heretofore seemingly intractable
problem of adequate information disclosures in determining the insured
value of a home.' 6
13 See Burkhardt v. Bailey, 680 N.W.2d 453, 464 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) ("'[T]he
bedrock principle of American contract law [is] that parties are free to contract
as they see fit, and the courts are to enforce the agreement as written absent
some highly unusual circumstance, such as a contract in violation of law or
public policy."' (quoting Wilkie v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 469 Mich. 41, 51
(2003)).
14 This Article will not address the related topic of how to address intentional or
negligent misconduct by agents or brokers.
15 See Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation
of Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389 (2007); Jeffrey W.
Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813
(2009).
16 This Article comes with a caveat. Of necessity, this Article touches upon
issues of highly theoretical economics. The Author is not an economist, and is
ill-suited to evaluate the highly sophisticated theorems of insurance pricing,
behavior, and market structure developed in nuanced economic models. See,
e.g., GEORGES DIONNE, HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE (Kluwer 2000). Rather, this
Article seeks to provide the platform for sensible legal regulatory reform of the
Virginia Journal ofSocial Policy & the Law [Vol. 18:3
Section I of this Article broadly describes the market structure of the
purchase and sale of residential property insurance, reviewing the
theoretical incentives for both buyers and sellers either to fully insure or
to underinsure, and identifies two inefficiencies in the conveyance of
adequate information-both concerning the adequacy of coverage.
Section II briefly surveys the historical and extant regulatory and judicial
responses to adequacy of coverage disputes. Section III proposes a
regulatory reform of the insurance markets. Section IV makes the case
for the proposal of Section III. Section V addresses anticipated criticisms
of the proposal of Section III.
I. THE PREVALENCE OF RESIDENTIAL UNDERINSURANCE AS A RESULT OF
MARKET INEFFICIENCY
A. THE SIZE OF THE RESIDENTIAL PROPER TYINSURANCE
MARKET
The residential property insurance market has over 50,000,000
captive customers, each of whom on average must have at least
$100,000 of residential property insurance. This is because anyone who
has a mortgage must have mortgage insurance of at least the amount of
the outstanding principal of the mortgage. Of course, people also may
voluntarily insure, and may insure for more than their mortgage balance.
Measured by annual premiums, the residential property insurance market
is a multi-billion dollar market.
In 2007, there were 75,647,000 owner-occupied homes in the United
States.17 Of these homes, 48,742,000 had a regular and/or home equity
mortgage.18 Indeed, 12,588,000 owner-occupied homes had two or more
residential property insurance markets, based on observable market behavior.
This Article indeed often relies on the words of insurers and homeowners
themselves in describing their decisions and perceptions.
17 2007 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.1A-7, supra note 7. This Article uses 2007 data
because it is the closest year from which there is comparative data from other
sources relied upon in this Article. See infra notes 62-63 and accompanying
text. In other words, 2007 is the best year to use to stay as best one can within an
"apples to apples" approach. There is, however, now a 2009 American Housing
Survey, and its data is reported in the footnotes of this Article. The 2009
American Housing Survey reflects that between 2007 and 2009 there is stability
in the numbers. For example, in 2009, there were 76,428,000 owner occupied
homes in the United States, an increase of just one percent over 2007. U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2009,
tbl.3-1 [hereinafter 2009 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.3-l].
18 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED
STATES: 2007, tbl.3-15 [hereinafter 2007 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.3-15]. In 2009,
50,300,000 homes had a regular and/or home equity mortgage. U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2009, tbl.3-15
[hereinafter 2009 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.3-15].
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mortgages.19 In 2007, 24,631,000 owner-occupied homes included the
cost of property insurance as part of their primary mortgage payment.20
(Almost certainly, in the majority of these instances, this occurred
because the homeowner had insufficient initial equity, and so a condition
of the loan was the creation of monthly payment-funded escrows for
insurance premiums, taxes, and so-called purchase-money insurance.)
Because of the structure of the secondary markets in mortgages,
having a mortgage equates to having homeowner's insurance.2 ' The
standard covenants for mortgages can be found on the websites of
22Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Each exemplar includes the requirement
that a mortgagee maintain hazard insurance on a home "in the amounts
(including deductible levels) and for the periods that Lender requires." 23
As a consequence, the insurance industry has a captive market of at
least 50,000,000 customers. In 2007, at least 48,742,000 homes were
required to have insurance by the explicit terms of mortgage. By 2009,
the figure was 50,300,000. The duty of a mortgagee to have insurance
can also exist independently of the explicit terms of the mortgage.24 And,
19 2007 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.3-15, supra note 18. In 2009, 11,697,000 owner
occupied homes reported having two or more mortgages. 2009 HOUSING
SURVEY tbl.3-15, supra note 18.
20 2007 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.3-15, supra note 18. In 2009, 26,595,000 owner-
occupied homes included the cost of property insurance as part of their primary
mortgage payment. 2009 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.3-15, supra note 18.
21 In 1970, Congress created the Federal National Mortgage Association
(FNMA, which today is popularly nicknamed Fannie Mae) and the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC, which today is popularly
nicknamed Freddie Mac). Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. §§
1713, 1717 (1970). The purpose of these entities was to "establish a secondary
market for conventional mortgages, primarily single family homes." Raymond
A. Jensen, Mortgage Standardization: History of Interaction of Economics,
Consumerism and Governmental Pressure, 7 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 397,
399 (1972). "[T]he policy decision was made by the two corporations that the
first order of business must be the development of a standard mortgage form."
Id.
22 FANNIE MAE, http://www.efanniemae.com; FREDDIE MAC, http://www.freddi
emac.com (last visited Apr. 14, 2011).
23 See, e.g., FANNIE MAE, California Security Instrument Form 3005: Word, at
6, available at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/secinstru
ments/doc/3005w.doc; FANNIE MAE, New York Security Instrument Form 3033:
Word, at 7, available at https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/s
ecinstruments/doc/3033. The full text of the relevant covenant from each of
these documents is reproduced in Appendix A hereto. See WELLS, supra note 8,
at 11.
24 See Raymond R. Koenders, Annotation, Duty of Mortgagee of Real Property
With Respect to Obtaining or Maintenance ofFire or Other Casualty Insurance
Protecting Mortgagor, 42 A.L.R.4th 188 (1985 and 2009 Supp.).
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of course, a homeowner may opt to purchase home insurance without a
legal or contractual requirement to do so.
Most residential insurance has a stated cap, or limit, on the proceeds
available to respond to a total loss. Put another way, residential property
insurance usually is not a "guaranteed replacement" policy (a policy that
pays for the rebuilding of a home regardless of cost). 25
If an insurance policy is not "guaranteed replacement," the amount
of coverage may be but is not necessarily "full," meaning that the
coverage amount will equal the entire approximated cost of rebuilding
the home. Even for a mortgaged home with mandated insurance, the
insurance purchase transaction will involve some latitude about the
percentage of coverage relative to the cost to rebuild the insured home in
the instance of total loss. While residential insurance protects the largest
asset most consumers will ever own,26 a mortgage does not require the
homeowner to fully insure, but rather requires the mortgagee to insure up
to the outstanding principal of the loan.27
The outstanding principal of the mortgage(s) on a home typically is
less than the value of the home. In 2007, the national median value of an
owner-occupied home was $191,471.28 In 2007, the median outstanding
principal on mortgages of owner-occupied homes was $100,904.29 Even
in the heart of the 2009-2010 "sub-prime mortgage crisis," analysts
25 See Insurance Services Office, The Impact of Catastrophes on Property
Insurance, at 3 (Jan. 1994); WELLS, supra note 8, at 21; see also Treaster, supra
note 1; Weston, supra note 1; Liz Pulliam Weston, Flirting With Disaster:
Millions of People Are Now Exposed to The Possibility of a Devastating Loss,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1998, at D; Rome Neal, Millions of Homes Under-Insured,
CBS NEWS, Sept. 15, 2004, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/14/earlysh
ow/contributors/raymartin/main643465.shtml (last visited June 24, 2009);
Daniel Schom, Is Your Home Underinsured?, CBS NEWS, July 4, 2007, http://w
ww.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/07/04/business/realestate/main3015665page2.sh
tml (last visited June 25, 2009).
26 CAL. DEP'T OF INS., STAT. ANALYSIS Div., Homeowners Study, at 2 (2008)
(reproduced at http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0200-studies-reports/02
50-homeowners-study).
27 See Koenders, supra note 24.
28 2007 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.1A-7, supra note 7. The separately published
information of the U.S. Census Bureau puts the figure slightly higher, at
$194,300. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY: 2007,
tbl.961, available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2010/tables/l0s09
61.pdf. In a stark reflection of the bursting of the housing bubble, the median
value for 2009 dropped to $170,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN
HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2009, tbl.3-14 (2010) [hereinafter
2009 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.3-14].
29 2007 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.IA-7, supra note 7. For 2009, the figure was
$106,909. 2009 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.3-15, supra note 18.
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calculated that roughly 75% of homes had value exceeding the
outstanding principal of any loans or mortgages against the property. 30
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners calculates that in
2006, "Dwelling Fire and Homeowners Owner-Occupied" insurance
policies covered over 60 million homes and accounted for over $48
billion in premiums.3 1
B. THEORETICAL INCENTIVES OF HOMEOWNERS AND INSURERS
WHEN DETERMINING THE AMOUNT OF RESIDENTIAL PROPERTY
COVERAGE
Many economists theorize that given the flexibility to determine the
amount of coverage, the "optimal" choice by a homeowner may be less
than full coverage. 3 2 Since the likelihood of a total loss is so remote, they
say, purchasing a full indemnity for this risk produces very low marginal
utility.33 This economic idea is in harmony with other studies showing
that the more remote a risk is, the less likely a consumer will voluntarily
insure against it.34
The likelihood in any given year of losing a home to disaster is, in
fact, very remote: the 2007 American Housing Survey data reports that
30 Underwater Mortgages on the Rise According to First American CoreLogic
Q4 2009 Negative Equity Data, FIRST AMERICAN CORELOGIC, Feb. 23, 2010, at
1, http://www.loanperformance.com/infocenter/library/Q4 2009 NegativeEqui
ty Final.pdf.
31 NAT'L Ass'N OF INS. COMM'RS, 2006 DWELLING FIRE, HOMEOWNERS
OWNER-OCCUPIED AND HOMEOWNERS TENANT AND CONDOMINIUM/COOPERAT
IVE UNIT OWNER'S INSURANCE REPORT, at 34 tbl.4, http://www.naic.org/docum
ents/research statshomeowners sample.pdf.
32 See generally Vernon L. Smith, Optimal Insurance Coverage, 76 J. POL.
ECON. 68 (1968); George G. Szpiro, Optimal Insurance Coverage, 52 J. RISK &
INs. 704 (1985). But see Christian Gollier, Optimal Insurance Design: What Can
We Do With and Without Expected Utility?, printed in GEORGES DIONNE,
HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 97-115 (Kluwer 2000) (arguing that if information is
adequate and symmetrical, the optimal insurance for a risk adverse purchaser
may be full insurance, depending upon various factors, such as the type of
deductible). An instructive analysis of the complexity of modeling optimal
insurance coverage (even assuming symmetrical information) is found in Harris
Schlesinger, The Theory of Insurance Demand, printed in GEORGES DIONNE,
HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 131-51 (Kluwer 2000).
3 Id
34 Daniel Schwarcz, A Products Liability Theory for the Judicial Regulation of
Insurance Policies, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1389, 1420-21 (2007) (citing,
among other sources, RISA PALM, EARTHQUAKE INSURANCE: A LONGITUDINAL
STUDY OF CALIFORNIA HOMEOWNERS 5-6 (1995); PAUL SLOVIC ET AL.,
Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications,
in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 51, 67-68 (Paul Slovic ed., 2000)); HOWARD
KUNREUTHER, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION: PUBLIC POLICY LESSONS
236-37 (1978).
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of the 75,647,000 owner-occupied homes in the United States, 41,000
homeowners of owner-occupied units (roughly one-twentieth of one
percent) reported that they moved from their home because of a
"Disaster loss (fire, flood, etc.)." 3 6
An insurer has at least three incentives to write less than full
coverage. The first is the concern of moral hazard. Economists who
study insurance posit that in theory, less than full coverage reduces the
incidence of loss by exposing the insured to some personal financial risk
from a loss. 3 7 There is little literature to support the conclusion that
moral hazard normatively results in behavior that causes the loss of
homes (it seems counterintuitive that a person is more likely to engage in
risky behavior, such as smoking in bed, simply because he has full
insurance; indeed, intuitively it seems just as likely that the person
willing to take the risk of smoking in bed is also more likely to gamble
on having less insurance), but reality does not matter-insurers perceive
moral hazard as a real concern38 and based on this perception have an
incentive to write less than full coverage.
A second concern of insurers is adverse selection. Adverse selection
is premised on the notion that because high-risk insureds will never
voluntarily self-identify their risk behaviors to an insurer, there is an
asymmetry of information between insured and insurer concerning risk.
Insurers therefore would have to overcharge premiums to all customers
(to such a level that insurance would fail as a product) unless the insurer
has the freedom to broadly categorize customers and price risk based
upon the more generic characteristics of the customer.3 9 This strategy can
run afoul of other legal and societal interests (hence the pejorative
characterization of adverse selection as "redlining"), and thus is not an
352007 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.1A-7, supra note 7.
36 2007 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.3-1 1, supra note 6. In 2009, of the 76,428,000
owner occupied homes, 24,000 (or three-hundredths of one percent) home
owners reported that they moved from their home because of a "Disaster loss
(fire, flood, etc.)." 2009 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.3-1, supra note 17; U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2009, tbl.3-1 1.
3 Steven Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 79 Q.J. ECON. 541 (1979).
See also Ralph A. Winter, Optimal Insurance under Moral Hazard, printed in
GEORGES DIONNE, HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE 155-83 (Kluwer 2000); Mark V.
Pauly, Overinsurance and Public Provision of Insurance: The Roles of Moral
Hazard and Adverse Selection, 88 Q.J. ECON. 44, 45 (1974) ("[A]n optimal
solution in this kind of 'moral hazard' situation is for the insured to retain some
part of his losses."). While I will argue at the end of this Article that moral
hazard imposes no cost on insurers, what matters at this juncture is that, as these
sources confirm, insurers consider moral hazard in analyzing optimal coverage.
3 Id.
39 See generally Georges Dionne, Neil Doherty & Nathalie Fombaron, Adverse
Selection in Insurance Markets (Working Paper 00-05, 2000), available at
http://neumann.hes.ca/gestiondesrisques/00-05.pdf.
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unfettered strategy option for insurers. 4 0 Constricting the ability to use
adverse selection creates an incentive to adopt an alternative strategy:
write less than full insurance for all customers.
The third incentive involves capturing and retaining market share.
The customer decision when purchasing new insurance can be a nuanced
one.4 1 But the purchase of residential property insurance is materially
price elastic.4 2 Residential property insurance is largely a commoditized
product.43 Sellers (insurers) compete on price. Put another way, while the
public may allege that its decision-making is based on other factors,44
insurers understand that the buying decision often is made on the basis of
premium. Thus, if the seller (the insurer) perceives that the costs of
selling full insurance outweigh the benefits, it has an incentive to
suppress price (the insurance premium) by selling less than full
insurance.
The industry perceives the cost consequence of selling full insurance
to be high. A 1996 whitepaper by the Insurance Services Office, a self-
described "leading industry source of information about risk," 45 found
that "[a]n insurer willing to pay the price of sufficient catastrophe
insurance could have trouble competing for business." 46
40 See generally Gregory D. Squires, Racial Profiling, Insurance Style:
Insurance Redlining and the Uneven Development of Metropolitan Areas, 25 J.
URB. AFF. 391 (2003).
41 An extended discussion of how and why customers choose their insurers is
found in Schwarcz, supra note 34, at 1404-22.
42 Economic research describes that residential property insurance is more price
elastic than other types of insurance, and catastrophe insurance is even more so.
See generally Martin F. Grace, Robert W. Klein & Paul R. Kleindorfer,
Homeowners Insurance with Bundled Catastrophe Coverage, 71 J. RISK & INS.
351 (2004).
43 One indicium that residential property insurance is a commodity is that there
are only six variations of policies, and 80% of all policies are written on an
identical form. 2006 Dwelling Fire, Homeowners Owner-Occupied, and
Homeowners Tenant and Condominium/Cooperative Unit Owner's Insurance
Report, NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS 34 tbl.4, http://www.naic.org/document
s/research statshomeownerssample.pdf. But see Daniel Schwarcz, The Need
for Insurance Policy Transparency, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming Dec. 2011)
(arguing that some coverage differs "radically" amongst insurers).
44 See Jeffrey E. Thomas, An Interdisciplinary Critique of the Reasonable
Expectations Doctrine, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 295, 311 (1998) (citing data that
reputation is the primary driver of consumer choice of homeowner insurer).
45 About ISO, INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, http://www.iso.com/About-
ISO/Overview/About-ISO.html (last visited April 1, 2011).
46 Insurance Services Office, Managing Catastrophe Risk (1996), at 4; accord
WELLS, supra note 8 ("As the industry moved closer to capped policy limits,
making certain that the policy limits included all of the costs faced when losses
Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law
Conversely, the perceived consequence of selling less than full
insurance is very small. Very rarely will a homeowner have a loss that
exceeds coverage (and thus potentially results in ex post facto customer
dissatisfaction), even if the customer has less than full insurance. It is
reported that less than 2% of residential insurance claims are for the total
loss of a house,47 and American Housing Survey data suggests it is far
less than 2%.48 Put another way, if in any given year an insurance claim
in any amount is remote, and total loss claims are exceptionally rare, and
at least some of those claims will have adequate insurance4 9 . The
likelihood of an underinsured total loss claim is, in a word, negligible.
Now contrast that "likelihood," such as it is, with the counter-incentive
that, "gaining greater market share . . . build[s] an increased capital base
for investment."50 It should not then be surprising that insurers do not
perceive that selling less than full insurance in order to capture greater
market share puts their business at risk of survival: "Large catastrophes
are rare; therefore, an insurer that does not have high catastrophe limits
is likely to survive.""
Of even greater potential importance are the incentives that arise in
retaining existing customers. The 2009 American Housing Survey
reports that of the 76,428,000 total owner occupied homes in 2009,
19,482,000 were acquired in the five years 2005-2009.52 In other words,
five percent (19,482,000/5/76,428,000) of homes change hands in a year,
which is the event that (if it is a mortgaged home) precipitates new
insurance of necessity. If, in any given year, there are not a lot of new
insurance customers, this puts a premium on retaining existing
customers. In the early 1990s, one insurer, Allstate, calculated its
occurred [would charge] ... premiums [increased] commensurate with the entire
risk assumed."). Again, it does not matter whether insurers are correct in this
evaluation; what matters is that insurers perceive that the insurer cannot afford
to write full insurance. This perception is a strong incentive to not write full
insurance.
47 Treaster, supra note 1; Neal, supra note 25. While reliance on media reports
for this figure is less than ideal, the insurance industry does not routinely
publicly disseminate its industry data.
8 See 2007 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.1A-7, supra note 7; 2007 HOUSING SURVEY
tbl.3-1 1, supra note 6.
49 This is, of course, why residential property insurance is relatively inexpensive.
so WELLS, supra note 8, at 50.
5 Insurance Services Office, supra note 46, at 4; see also VERONIQUE
BRUGGEMAN, COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS: A COMPARATIVE LAW
AND ECONOMICS APPROACH 96 (2010) ("[A] lot of factors can make it difficult
for the insurance industry to supply liability insurance for man-made
catastrophes, but there generally does not seem to be limited insurance capacity .
... [T]he U.S. insurance industry could adequately fund catastrophic property
losses.. . .").
52 See 2009 HOUSING SURVEY tbl.3-14, supra note 28; 2009 HOUSING SURVEY
tbl.3-15, supra note 18.
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renewal rate of homeowners insurance at roughly 90%. 3 Thus, the goal
from the perspective of the insurer should be for the renewal to be as
seamless as possible for the insured. In other words, the insurer should
avoid prompting the customer to ponder whether there is an alternative,
preferred insurer. In the frequently occurring environment of rising
rebuilding costs, maintaining full coverage (or, for that matter, any
percentage level of coverage) might militate a recurring revaluation of
the property as well as increased premium. But this is contrary to the
goal of seamless renewal. And since total loss claims appear to be
extremely rare, the rational choice for the insurer is simply to let the
coverage-to-value ratio deteriorate over time rather than raise premiums
and thus lose an indeterminate set of renewals. This will cause even
initially fully insured homeowners to become underinsured over time.
Indeed, not only does an insurer have incentive to sell less than full
insurance, but also the insurer's agent or broker has incentive to
understate the value54 of the home (the base figure against which
percentage of coverage is calculated). In the period when most insurers
wrote guaranteed replacement coverage, "[s]ales and marketing channels
within insurance organization[s] would, with regular frequency,
downplay the necessity of properly reflecting the replacement cost value
needed to properly insure homes."5 Using correct valuation approaches
"could create a conflict in goals between the best interests of the carrier
or underwriter insuring a property and those of an agent primarily
charged with the generation of new business."5 1
Capping coverage does not change these incentives. A higher
coverage still equates to higher premiums, which exposes an insurer to
losing a customer on the basis of price. The likelihood of a claim
exceeding coverage remains de minimus. Therefore the rational choice is
to understate value. Reinforcing this view is work in law and economics
confirming the common-sense intuition that insurance purchasers often
are systematically uninformed about insurance or inclined to decide
5 Allstate, Total Personal Lines Administrative Meeting (Feb. 13, 1995),
http://www.allstatenewsroom.com/media/PDF/H0O0000001.pdf; accord Justin
Sydnor, Abundant Aversion to Moderate Risk: Evidence From Homeowners
Insurance, at 14 (Working Paper, 2006), http://faculty.weatherhead.case.edu/sy
dnor/deductibles old.pdf ("[R]oughly 12% of the sample consisted of customers
who were new to the company in the sample year.").
54 For purposes of this Article, "value" refers to the cost of rebuilding the home.
5 This incentive is alluded to in Neal, supra note 25.
56 WELLS, supra note 8, at 51.
57id
58 Weston, supra note 1; Lazarus, supra note 1; Treaster, supra note 1; Chu &
Weise, supra note 1; Neal, supra note 25.
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irrationally about coverage, and that in either circumstance insurers are
incentivized to (and do) exploit that circumstance.59
In summary, in analyzing the structure and incentives in residential
insurance markets, one would predict that most customers should not
want to insure to full value, most insurers would not want to insure to
full value, and most insurance agents and brokers would wish to
understate actual value.
C. REGARDLESS OF ECONOMIC MODELING OF OPTIMAL LEVELS
OF INSURANCE, HOMEOWNERSACTUALLY WANTFULL
INSURANCE
The analysis of the residential property insurance market predicts
that most customers would not want to insure to full value, and most
insurers would not want to insure to full value. Actual market behavior
largely bears out these predictions, but also exposes an important
divergence: a large and growing segment of consumers (now
approaching a majority) will choose to fully insure, despite the
theoretical work arguing that full insurance is rarely if ever optimal.
1. The Pervasiveness of Underinsurance.
Marshall & Swift/Boeckh, the company that manufactures the
software insurers commonly use to calculate adequate insurance
coverage, is self-interested in promoting the use of accurate tools to
measure value. Marshall & Swift/Boeckh reports that for the years it
studied, roughly 60% of American homeowners were underinsured by
roughly 20-25%: 60
59 SCHWARCZ, supra note 34, at 1403 (citing Victor P. Goldberg, Institutional
Change and the Quasi-invisible Hand, 17 J.L. & EcoN. 461, 485 (1974); Michael
I. Meyerson, The Efficient Consumer Form Contract: Law and Economics Meet
the Real World, 24 GA. L. REv. 583, 595 (1990); Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by
Plastic, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1373, 1376 (2004); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A.
Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 (1999); and Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking
Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 1420 (1999)).
6 WELLS, supra note 8, at 46; see also Weston, supra note 1; Treaster, supra
note 1; Neal, supra note 25; Chu & Weise, supra note 1.
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YEAR PERCENT OF HOMES AVERAGE DEGREE OF
UNDERINSURED UNDERINSURANCE
2002 and 73 % 35 %
prior




This work is supported by the work of United Policyholders, a leading
consumer advocacy group concerned with the frequency and cause of
underinsurance. United Policyholders surveyed homeowners impacted
by the 2007 wildfires in San Diego six months, one year, and two years
after the loss of their homes; these surveys put the frequency of
underinsurance at 66-75%.61
The Marshall & Swift/Boeckh data, a nationally comprehensive
study, describes that even if the "optimal" choice by a homeowner is to
underinsure, the percentage of homeowners who fully insure is just over
40%-and is rising. Put another way, a material and increasing
percentage of homeowners are sufficiently risk adverse that they will and
do purchase full coverage.62
Even this 40% is not the full set of cases where the amount of
insurance purchased is not economically "optimal." There also will be
6 A hyperlink to the entirety of the survey data is found at http://www.uphelp.or
g/library/resource/southern-califomia-wildfire-claim-survey-results (last visited
Apr. 14, 2011). The complete data set is on file with the author, who has access
to it by virtue of his work with UPH in the wake of the 2007 and 2008
California wildfires. In the years 2003-2008, Southern California has had
seriatim wildfires in residential communities. There is no ambiguity that
insurance covers losses to wildfire. Therefore, the Southern California wildfires
provide a unique data set to study the issues raised in this Article.
62 The goal of the proposal within this Article is not that insurers are forced to
sell, and homeowners are forced to purchase, the "optimal" level of insurance.
Rather, the goal of this Article is to create sufficient comfort that the homeowner
was adequately informed of the coverage level, so that in the event of an
underinsured loss, there need not be protracted debate over who bears
responsibility for the rebuild costs in excess of coverage.
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cases where the purchase is less than full but still too high, and cases
where the purchase is too low-both not optimal purchases.63
In sum, residential property insurance is a market with over
60,000,000 customers, and it appears that a material percentage, perhaps
50% or more, of these customers are purchasing other than the "optimal"
amount of insurance.
2. The Pervasiveness of Unintended Underinsurance.
If, despite homeowners' desire to over-insure, insurers have both an
incentive to undervalue and to underinsure, then one would predict that
homeowners are actually purchasing less insurance-both in gross
dollars and as a percentage of actual value-than the homeowners are
seeking to purchase. This would then mean, by extension, that the
percentage of homeowners who actually fully insure is less than the
percentage of consumers who wish to fully insure. If the percentage of
homeowners who actually fully insure currently is just over 40% and is
rising, this suggests that the percentage of consumers who wish to fully
insure is at least 50%. Because of concern with moral hazard and
adverse selection, one predicts that an insurer still has an incentive to not
offer full value coverage to these consumers. Also, one predicts insurers
have an incentive to understate actual full value.
Market behavior bears out these predictions. According to the
Insurance Information Network of California, the 2003 Southern
California firestorms totally destroyed 3631 homes and the 2007
Southern California firestorms totally destroyed 2180 homes; the two
firestorms combined resulted in over 1000 (roughly 20%) formal
"Requests for Assistance"6 (RFA) to the California Department of
Insurance regarding underinsurance (in other words, homeowners
asserting they had less insurance than they had expected). The number of
A consumer may unintentionally purchase too little coverage because of the
insurer's incentive to understate the value of the insured structure. Thus, for
example, if (1) the optimal level of insurance is 90% of value, (2) a homeowner
intends to insure at 90% of value, (3) the home has an actual value of $400,000,
and (4) the insurer convinces the homeowner that the home value is $300,000,
then the homeowner will purchase $270,000 of coverage, which is $90,000 less
than optimal coverage.
6 An RFA is not a request for governmental financial assistance. Rather, it is the
form that a consumer completes to initiate a formal investigation of an insurer's
practices. See California Department of Insurance, About Us: An Introduction to
CDI Operations (2004), http://www.insurance.ca.gov/0500-about-us/0100-cdi-
introduction.
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requests increased in 2007, despite a significantly fewer number of total
home losses.65
Other data supports the conclusion that at least roughly 20% of
homeowners had less insurance than they had expected. The work of
United Policyholders reports that of homeowners of lost or damaged
homes in the 2007 Southern California firestorms who had not reached
an acceptable settlement with their insurer by six months after the fires,
17% reported filing an RFA with the Department of Insurance by one
year after the fires. 66 Two years after the fires, 28% had filed RFAs. 67 But
of the remaining 83%, roughly one-third explained either a concern that
it would make matters worse, they did not want to anger the insurer, they
did not know how to file an RFA, or they did not think it would do any
good. 8 Six months after the fires, 74% of homeowners reported they did
not have sufficient coverage to rebuild or repair their homes, and 64% of
homeowners reported the amount of funds offered by their insurer was
not sufficient to rebuild their homes (this included homeowners with
partial losses).69 Two years after the fires, 53% of homeowners reported
they did ultimately have sufficient coverage to rebuild or repair their
homes, while 47% reported the insurer agreed to pay them the full
amount necessary to rebuild or repair their homes (this included
homeowners with partial losses).70
65 Insurance Information Network of California, Southern California Firestorms
of 2003 & 2007 Compared (on file with author) (reproduced in full, infra app.
B). One of the many ways this could arise is when a homeowner meets with a
broker or agent, answers all questions asked, and is quoted a policy price; that
home owner would have little reason to be aware that the insurer may have used
a "quick quote" function in the Marshall & Swift software that calculates value
incorrectly. See Weston, supra note 1; Treaster, supra note 1; Neal, supra note
25; Chu & Weise, supra note 1.
66 See one-year survey results data at http://www.uphelp.org/pdfs/OneYearSurve
yResults2009.pdf.
67 See two-year survey results data at http://www.uphelp.org/survey files/TwoY
earSurveyResults.xls.
68 Id.
69 See six-month survey results data at http://www.uphelp.org/survey files/2007
WildfireClaimSurveyCompleteandPartialSurveyResults.htm. The apparent
discrepancy between these two figures results from at least two scenarios: (1)
instances when insurers offered settlements in excess of stated policy limits, and
(2) instances when homeowners had insufficient coverage to rebuild precisely
the home lost, but sufficient funds to rebuild a different home acceptable to them
and the lender.
70 See two-year survey results data at http://unitedpolicyholders.org/survey/surve
yresults.html. This later figure suggests that only a subset of the full group of
underinsureds utilize a formal request for assistance (others in the group will do
nothing, or will pursue less formal steps such as simply negotiating directly with
the insurer, or will skip to more formal steps such as litigation).
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The ex post facto record of natural disasters is replete with anecdotal
homeowner claims either that they wanted more insurance but could not
get it, or that they were assured by their broker or agent that they had
adequate insurance.7 But of course, what homeowners claim, especially
after the fact, is hardly dispositive of what homeowners intended at the
inception. The insurance industry itself, however, recognizes the
pervasiveness of unintended underinsurance. One insurance trade journal
reported from a 2010 Zogby/Metlife Auto & Home insurance survey that
"Nearly one third (31 percent) of Americans don't know how much their
71 Chu & Weise, supra note 1; Treaster, supra note 1; Lazarus, supra note 1;
CBS Evening News, supra note 1; see also Free v. Republic Ins. Co., 8 Cal. App.
4th 1726, 1729 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) ("According to the complaint ... [in 1979]
and every succeeding year [until 1989] . . . appellant contacted [the insurance
representative] to inquire whether the coverage limits if his policy were
adequate to rebuild his home. On each occasion, he was informed they were.");
Cheek v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 5973 (9th Cir. Cal.
Mar. 26, 1997) ("The Cheeks' Complaint alleged that State Farm was negligent
in failing to provide them with a certain level of earthquake coverage, as they
had specifically requested .... ); Appellant's Opening Brief, Aslan v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 125 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 1996), 1996 WL 33486909, at *5
("Respondent assured Kenneth Asian [sic] that his earthquake policy was
sufficient ..... ); Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 47 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1114
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("Desai informed an insurance vendor, Carol Sacramone
Insurance Agency, that he wanted 100 percent coverage .... Sacramone told
Desai that Farmers Insurance Group offered the type of insurance Desai wanted,
and orally represented that the policy provided '100% coverage' ..... ); White
v. Allstate Ins. Co., 513 F. Supp. 2d 674, 677 (E.D. La. 2007) ("Plaintiffs further
allege that Tarleton indicated that the hurricane coverage under their
homeowner's policy would cover any and all damages that might be incurred as
a result of a hurricane."); Cameron Parish Sch. Bd. v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 560 F. Supp. 2d 485, 487 (W.D. La. 2008) ("In its Complaint, CPSB
alleges that State Farm knew CPSB's flood insurance was insufficient, that State
Farm knew CPSB wanted to maximize its flood insurance, and that State Farm
did not tell CPSB additional flood insurance could be purchased outside of the
NFIA and with another company."); Smith v. Kert LeBlanc Ins. Agency, Inc.,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43287, at *2-3 (E.D. La. 2008) ("Plaintiffs contend that
they should be paid more than their policy limits because State Farm did not
advise them upon renewal of their policy that the amount of their coverage
would be insufficient to completely rebuild their home following its destruction.
. . . Plaintiffs argue that they specifically desired and purchased a 'full
replacement policy."'); Martinonis v. Utica Natl. Ins. Grp., 840 N.E.2d 994, 996
(Mass. App. Ct. 2006) ("'I definitely brought up to him all of this information
and questioned him and asked him and asked him whether it shouldn't be
increased. And he reassured me that that should be adequate."'); Stevens v.
Hickey-Finn & Co., Inc., 261 A.D.2d 300, 300-01 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)
("Plaintiff requested 'proper and adequate' coverage ... in response, the agent,
as she had in prior years, utilized a 'Home Aestimator' computer program to
check .... In the aftermath of a fire at the insured premises, plaintiff discovered
that, in fact, he had been seriously underinsured . . . .").
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most valuable assets-their homes-are insured for" and that despite
"nearly all" insurance companies capping coverage for an insured loss of
a home, "More than two thirds (71 percent) of those surveyed believe
insurance pays for the full cost to rebuild their property in the event of a
major loss, such as a fire or other natural disaster." 72 Simply put, most
Americans think they have more insurance than they actually have.
D. THE PERVASIVENESS OFAMBIGUITY CONCERNING WHETHER
THE INSURER OR THE HOMEOWNER BEARS THE RISK OF
UNDER VAL UATION RESULTING IN UNDERINSURANCE
So how does this happen? How is it that half of America has less
insurance coverage than it thinks it has? As described above, insurers
have an incentive to understate the actual value of their homes, and that
incentive plays out in a variety of ways in actual market transactions. 73 If
insurers act in accordance with this incentive, then homes are
underinsured relative to their value even if the homeowner selects the
optimal percentage of insured value. The insurance industry has a
several-decade history of understating value.
Following World War II, the market for homes exploded, thus
creating both mortgage lenders insisting on homeowner's insurance and
the homeowner's insurance market.74 "Since homeowners were not
prepared to [evaluate the cost of replacing a lost home], the insurance
industry began to take an active and scientific role in establishing total
replacement cost before losses actually occurred." 5 But as market
changes necessitated the revision of formulas, insurers were slow to
react, resulting in underinsurance .76
Before 1994, when most residential insurance policies were
"guaranteed replacement policies," insurers explicitly bore the
responsibility for accurate valuation. "The history of homeowners'
insurance business after World War II . . . eventually taught property
writers that the financial viability of their business is directly linked to
establishing accurate defendable insurable values for each risk
insured."77 In other words, in the context of guaranteed replacement, or
de facto full insurance policies, the party bearing the responsibility for
valuation also bore the cost from error in the calculation.
72 Homeowners Coverage Knowledge Gap Wide Among Consumers, INSURANCE
JOURNAL, Aug. 24, 2010, http://www.insurancejoumal.com/news/national/2010/
08/24/112704.htm.
73 See Weston, supra note 1; Treaster, supra note 1; Neal, supra note 25; Chu &
Weise, supra note 1.
74 WELLS, supra note 8, at 7-12.
75 Id. at 11.
76Id. at 7-20.
7 Id. at 21.
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Starting in 1994, in response to the perceived cost of providing no-
limit insurance for a total loss,7 8 almost all insurers did away with
"guaranteed replacement" policies.7 9 When guaranteed replacement
coverage ceased to be the industry norm, this created both an increased
incentive to undervalue a home, and ambiguity as to whether the insurer
or the homeowner bore the risk of undervaluation.
Capped insurance coverage created, in the first instance, the
possibility of underinsurance. By doing so, capped insurance increased
the incentive to an insurer to understate property value. This is because
capped coverage reduces the risk of valuation error to the insurer.80
Under guaranteed replacement policies, in the event of total loss, the
carrier paid claims in excess of the base values upon which premium was
calculated. The insurer bore the full cost of valuation error. Under
capped policies, an insurer only bore this cost of error if, in the
terminology of insurance law, the policy was "reformed" in the wake of
loss (typically as a result of litigation) to provide coverage as if the value
had been correctly stated.
The elimination of guaranteed replacement coverage also created
ambiguity about whether insurers or homeowners bore ultimate
responsibility for errors in valuation. This ambiguity can be seen in the
contrasting post-loss positions of homeowners and insurers.
Homeowners perceive their brokers or agents to be experts on how much
insurance is adequate. 82 But brokers and agents contend their expertise is
not risk valuation, but rather the nuances of policies and forms, and the
7 Insurance Services Office, The Impact of Catastrophes on Property
Insurance, Jan. 1994, at 3.
7 Weston, supra note 1; Treaster, supra note 1; Liz Pulliam, supra note 25;
Daniel Schorn, Is Your Home UnderInsured?, CBS NEWS, July 4, 2007,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/07/04/business/realestate/main30 15 6 6 5_p
age2.shtml (last visited June 25, 2009); Neal, supra note 25; see also Everett v.
State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 4th 649, 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) ("In
1997, State Farm eliminated the guaranteed replacement cost coverage in its
homeowners policies."). As of the time of this writing, one major insurer-Auto
Club-still offered guaranteed replacement insurance.
80 In the instance of capped coverage, the homeowner has contractually agreed
to a particular figure as the coverage amount. This figure may or may not be
indexed in the mind of the contracting parties to the value of the home, but
nonetheless routinely is enforced by the courts. See infra Section E.
8' See, e.g., United Policyholders, Avoiding Underinsurance, Fall 2004,
http://unitedpolicyholders.com/newsletters/fall04.html#4 (last visited Jan. 14,
2011); United Policyholders, Underinsurance 101, Fall 2004,
http://unitedpolicyholders.com/pdfs/UNDERINSURANCE101.pdf (last visited
Jan. 14, 2011).
82 Treaster, supra note 1, at Al.
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resulting differences between various insurance policies.83 As a
spokesman for Insurance Information Network of California said in the
wake of the 2003 California wildfires, "'It's ultimately up to the
homeowners to try to ascertain if [the coverage] is enough."' 84 The
American Insurance Association argues that "it really is the homeowner
who is in the best position" to know what coverage is needed. Identical
arguments are made by the Association of California Insurance
Companies and the Personal Insurance Federation of California.86
E. ONE APPROACH TO ELIMHNATING INSURER RESPONSIBILITY
FOR UNDERVALUATION
One would predict that a rational insurer would, if it could, eliminate
any potential insurer responsibility for undervaluation, and do so in a
way that would not cause the customer to choose a different insurer. That
prediction is borne out by a clause now found in some insurance
policies.
The clause and its mechanism are illustrated by the case of Everett v.
State Farm General Insurance Co.87 From 1991 to 1997, Agnes Everett's
home was insured by State Farm with guaranteed replacement cost
coverage.88 In 1997, State Farm provided written notification to Ms.
Everett that her policy was being changed to limit replacement
coverage.89 That renewal provided a specific amount of "replacement
83 Beisiegel, supra note 1, at 21.
84 Spagat, supra note 1; see also Treaster, supra note 1, at Al (quoting a
representative of the Insurance Information Institute saying, "'It's the
homeowner's responsibility to see that his home is properly insured"'); Liz
Pulliam, supra note 25, at Dl (quoting a spokesperson for Framers Insurance,
'The consumer has the responsibility to determine what their coverage should
be"'); Smith v. Kert LeBlanc Ins. Agency Inc., 2008 WL 2308828, at *1 (E.D.
La. 2008) ("[A]ccording to State Farm, ... [it is the homeowner] upon whom
the duty rested to advise their insurer of any necessary increase in coverage.").
Letter from American Insurance Association to Honorable Ronald M. George,
Chief Justice, California Supreme Court (July 7, 2008).
86 Letter from Association of California Insurance Companies and Personal
Insurance Federation of California to Honorable Ronald M. George, Chief
Justice, California Supreme Court (June 25, 2008); Letter from Association of
California Insurance Companies and Personal Insurance Federation of California
to Honorable Ronald M. George, Chief Justice, California Supreme Court (July
2, 2008). For the perspective of the policyholder on Everett, see Lee Harris,
Does Everett v. State Farm Shut the Door on Underinsured Homeowners?,
FORUM, Nov./Dec. 2008, at 17.
Everett v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 4th 649, (Cal. Ct. App.
2008).
Id. at 652.
89 Id. at 652-53.
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cost" coverage should Ms. Everett suffer a total loss of her home.90 For
the next six years, each annual renewal statement from State Farm to Ms.
Everett stated:
The State Farm replacement cost is an estimated
replacement cost based on general information about
your home. It is developed from models that use cost of
construction materials and labor rates for like homes in
the area. 9' The actual cost to replace your home may be
significantly different. State Farm does not guarantee
that this figure will represent the actual cost to replace
your home. You are responsible for selecting the
appropriate amount of coverage and you may obtain an
appraisal or contractor estimate which State Farm will
consider and accept, if reasonable. Higher coverage
amounts may be selected and will result in higher
premiums.92
In October of 2003, Ms. Everett lost her home to wildfire.93
The resulting litigation reflects that the clause had the effect, at least
in the one litigated instance, of eliminating risk to State Farm of
undervaluation, without creating risk to State Farm of losing a customer.
At trial, State Farm successfully pointed to and relied upon the policy
language, "You are responsible for selecting the appropriate amount of
coverage." 94 Yet State Farm almost certainly never was at risk of losing
Ms. Everett as a customer, since if Ms. Everett ever read the language,
she would have understood State Farm to be discouraging her from
questioning the adequacy of her coverage. After all, State Farm told her
that it had calculated the cost of rebuilding her home and if she wanted
to ask State Farm for more insurance, then she would have to spend
money and hire professionals to support why she wanted more
insurance. Even then, State Farm might not agree to give her more
insurance, and if State Farm did agree, then that would cost her yet more
money. In the face of the State Farm clause, Ms. Everett believed she
was entitled to full replacement coverage, without regard to policy
limits.95
90 Id. at 653-54.
91 Although it is not clear from the published Opinion, almost certainly the
"model" used was the Marshall & Swift "quick quote" function, which
calculates cost using only zip code, square footage, and year of construction.
92 Everett, 162 Cal. App. 4th at 653.
9 Id. at 653-54.
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F THE INCENTIVES TO UNDERINSURE HAVE CREATED MARKET
INEFFICIENCIES
Summarizing the preceding sections, we see that while a large and
increasing percentage of homeowners wish to fully insure, insurers
perceive that "[a]n insurer willing to pay the price of sufficient
catastrophe insurance could have trouble competing for business."96 This
frames something akin to a prisoner's dilemma for insurers. Insurers are
competing against each other for a fixed number of customers in a
largely mature market (most potential customers already are actual
customers). Insurers see the market largely as commoditized. Using
sound actuarial principles to calculate premium should yield roughly the
same premium for all insurers. While an insurer may have an economic
incentive to use less sound, more aggressive actuarial principles,
insurance is a regulated product requiring state approval of the actuarial
soundness of an insurance product. The other variable in setting price is
the "valuation" of the home. And here lies the "prisoner's dilemma." If
an insurer could depend upon competitors to do accurate valuations, then
the insurer is not at risk of losing market share on the basis of valuation
approach. Otherwise, the insurer has an incentive to adopt two strategies:
(1) devise "valuation" formulas that support lower valuation than those
of one's competitors without putting the actuarial soundness of the
business at risk, and (2) shift the risk of underinsurance due to
undervaluation to the homeowner in a manner that does not change
price.
The products of Marshall & Swift/Boeckh (the producer of the
predominant valuation tools) assume that while there are many ways to
calculate valuation, there is only one, objectively accurate valuation.9 7
Insurance brokers and agents certainly would debate this assertion,
viewing valuation as much more art than science-and a potentially
prohibitively time-consuming art at that. In other words, in writing new
business, with enough time and attention, agents and brokers could value
a home into a relatively tight range, but the time dedicated to each home
96 Insurance Services Office, Managing Catastrophe Risk, May 1996,
http://www.iso.com/Research-and-Analyses/Studies-and-Whitepapers/Managing
-Catastrophe-Risk.html; see also WELLS, supra note 8, at 43 ("As the industry
moved closer to capped policy limits, making certain that the policy limits
included all of the costs faced when losses occurred [would charge] . . .
premiums commensurate with the entire risk assumed.").
9 http://msbinfo.com/Solutions (last visited Apr. 14, 2011) ("Our products,
methods and data help take the guesswork out of risk selection and pricing and
help you truly see risks for what they are"); http://msbinfo.com/Solutions/RiskS
election/InsuranceToValue (last visited Apr. 14, 2011) ("We base this approach
on the concept that a building's unique features, rather than its square footage,
determine its actual reconstruction cost"); see also WELLS, supra note 8, at v
("This new text ... helps carriers identify the true value of each individual risk").
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would be inconsistent with a successful business model, even assuming
customers would stand for it. The problem would be even worse in the
instance of renewed basis, as it would be inconsistent with the idea of a
seamless renewal process.
If an insurer has to choose between likely undervaluation and likely
overvaluation, the rational strategy is to either intentionally promote or
passively allow an undervaluation. Property insurance is highly price
elastic, so overvaluation inevitably will result in fewer customers. By
contrast, if most homes do not have an insured loss at all in a coverage
year, and less than two percent of claims are total loss claims, then a
home fully insured to stated value-but actually undervalued-is
unlikely to experience a loss in excess of coverage, and in turn an
unhappy customer who does not renew the policy (even assuming the
insurer wishes this customer to renew). The only real risk to an insurer is
that a loss in excess of coverage will occur, and that the insurer will be
held responsible for the shortfall.98 That risk is perceived by the insurers
to be low, even in the face of mass loss from, for example, natural
disaster: "Large catastrophes are rare; therefore, an insurer that does not
have high catastrophe limits is likely to survive."99
But the benefit of this approach can be enhanced if the insurer can
shift the risk of underinsurance due to undervaluation onto the
homeowner, and do so in a manner that does not raise prices. The
challenge is that in a commoditized marketplace, even a homeowner
who wants "full" insurance will select his insurer by picking the
cheapest insurance. If the insurer discloses to the homeowner that what
really is being offered is "full" insurance of only 80% of the house, then
the insurer may well lose that customer.100 The consequence is an
incentive to have a home that is undervalued, and a homeowner who in
making the purchase decision is not accounting for the risk of
undervaluation. This is, in essence, the Everett clause.
Two inefficiencies result:
(1) Inadequate information impairing informed pricing decisions by
purchasers.
98 One might quarrel with the morality of such a strategy, but at this juncture this
Article simply is laying out the rationality of such a strategy.
9 Insurance Services Office, supra note 96.
100 There is a joke about a hungry traveler who, upon stopping at a roadside
restaurant that has a huge sign advertising it is "Open 24 Hours," encounters the
restaurant owner locking the doors and closing for the evening. When the now
distraught traveler asks about the sign, the owner responds, "The sign doesn't
say which 24 hours!"
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(2) Dispute costs (such as litigation) in the instances of loss exceeding
coverage.
There is some limited data available to quantify the cost of
inadequate information impairing informed pricing decisions by
purchasers. This inaccessibility of contract language to consumers is an
understood dynamic in lengthy insurance contracts. The length of
insurance policies, and the lack of prominence of the disclosure, can
utterly defeat any effectiveness it otherwise might have.' 0 Homeowners
are not fully aware of how their coverage is calculated, or what their
policy says or means.102 Compounding the policy's lack of clarity, the
homeowner typically does not even get his full insurance policy until
long after the policy is purchased.10 3
101 Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1399 (citing DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY LAW 589-92 (Thomson West 2005)); Howard Latin, "Good"
Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1193,
1195, 1198 (1994); A.D. Twerski et al., The Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L.
REV. 495, 511-16 (1976); W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard
Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 627
(1996); Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and
Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA. L. REV. 565, 583-84
(2006).
102 See ROBERT H. JERRY, II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 32[b]
(Matthew Bender 2d ed. 1996) ("[A]n insured relies not upon the text of the
policies but upon the general descriptions of the coverage provided by the
insurer and its agents."); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in
Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1179 (1983); see also, WELLS, supra
note 8, at 53 (it is believed in the industry that consumers have "no real
understanding of the value of their structures or the pricing variables that
determine[] their rates").
103 See, e.g., Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance With Policy
Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (1970) (explaining that "the normal
processes for marketing most kinds of insurance do not ordinarily place the
detailed policy terms in the hands of the policyholder until the contract has
already been made. In life insurance marketing, for example, the policyholder
does not ordinarily see the policy terms until he has signed the application (his
offer to contract with the company) and has paid a premium, and the company
has approved the application and has executed and issued the policy. This often
means a delay of weeks, and occasionally even longer, between making an
application and having possession of the policy-a factor enhancing the
policyholder's disinclination to read his policy carefully or even to read it at
all"); Michelle E. Boardroom, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1105, 1106 (2006) ("[I]nsurance contracts typify
the modem consumer contract-boilerplate clauses, little negotiation, written in
legalese, and received by the consumer only after the contract has begun.").
Insurers also have asserted that policy language can equate to a counter-offer,
which the insured then accepts by retaining the policy and paying the premiums.
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Each year hundreds of millions of dollars of uninsured losses result
from unintended underinsurance. The California Department of
Insurance reports there were 5817 residential insurance claims resulting
from the November 2008 firestorms in Central California.104 The 5817
claims resulted in over $610,000,000 in direct incurred loss, only
roughly 75% of which was paid. 05 This means that roughly
$150,000,000 in incurred losses (meaning losses which the insurer felt
were sufficiently credibly covered claims that the insurer reserved
against them) were losses where the homeowner claimed coverage, and
the insurer denied it.
The same firestorms resulted in 733 total loss claims. 0 6 We can
assume that the vast bulk of the $150,000,000 arose in those cases.
As many as 50% of insured homes think they have "full"
insurance.' 0 7 The one-year survey of United Policyholders found that
51% of homeowners reported, after loss, that they were either "very
unsatisfied" or "unsatisfied" with the adequacy of their insurance
coverage in the wake of loss.'0o In other words, undervaluation, even
very conservatively calculated, caused an unexpected, uninsured loss due
to underinsurance of tens of millions of dollars in 733 homes. In an
average year, across the Nation, there are in excess of 30,000 homes that
are totally lost to disaster.109 The United Policyholders survey of
survivors of the 2007 Southern California firestorms reported the
average amount of underinsurance to be $240,000.110
Appellee's Brief at *6, Cheek v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 95-56601,
1996 WL 33486441 (9th Cir. Apr. 4, 1996).
104 California Department of Insurance, Estimate of Summary Loss Data




107 See supra section II.C. 1.
108 See one-year survey results data at United Policyholders, Southern
California Wildfire Claim Survey Results, http://www.uphelp.org/pdfs/OneYear
SurveyResults2009.pdf (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
109 This is the average of American Housing figures over the last decade. In
2007, 41,000 homeowners of owner-occupied units reported that they moved
from their home because of a "Disaster loss (fire, flood, etc.)." 2007 HOUSING
SURVEY tbl 3-11, supra note 6. In 2005, it was 22,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2005, tbl.3-1 1. In 2003,
it was 34,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE
UNITED STATES: 2003, tbl.3-11. In 2001, it was 22,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY FOR THE UNITED STATES: 2001, tbl.3-11.
110 See six-month survey results data at United Policyholders, Southern
California Wildfire Claim Survey Results, http://unitedpolicyholders.org/survey/
surveyresults.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2011).
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The cost of dispute resolution is harder to quantify."' The cost can
arise in at least three ways: (1) extended and contentious claims
resolution that does not result in external dispute resolution mechanisms;
(2) complaints and requests for intervention to external entities (such as
a state Department of Insurance) that do not result in litigation; and (3)
litigation. A survey from United Policyholders calculates the frequency
of unsuccessful claims negotiations as 64%. 12As discussed above, about
20% of these instances resulted in complaints to the Department of
Insurance." 3 Even a cursory survey of reported legal decisions reveals a
lot of litigation disputes over the causes of and responsibility for
underinsurance. 14 It is hard to know with precision, however, just how
". For a broader discussion of the cost of litigation as a tool of insurance
regulation, see KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, The Insurance Effects of Regulation by
Litigation, in REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION 212-43 (W. Kip Viscusi ed.,
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies 2002).
1 See Southern Calfornia Wildfire Claim Survey Results, supra note 110.
113 See supra text accompanying notes 66-67.
"4 See, e.g., Free v. Republic Ins. Co., 8 Cal. App. 4th 1726, 1729 (Cal. Ct. App.
1992) ("According to the complaint, . . . [in 1979] and every succeeding year
[until 1989] . . . appellant contacted [the insurance representative] to inquire
whether the coverage limits if his policy were adequate to rebuild his home. On
each occasion, he was informed they were."); Cheek v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 110 F.3d 67 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The Cheeks Complaint alleged that State
Farm was negligent in failing to provide them with a certain level of earthquake
coverage, as they had specifically requested . . . ."); Opening Brief of Appellant
at 5, Aslan v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 125 F.3d 857 (9th Cir. 1996)
("Respondent assured Kenneth Asian [sic] that his earthquake policy was
sufficient .... ); Desai v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 47 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1114
(Cal. Ct. App. 1996) ("Desai informed an insurance vendor, Carol Sacramone
Insurance Agency, that he wanted 100 percent coverage . . . . Sacramone told
Desai that Farmers Insurance Group offered the type of insurance Desai wanted,
and orally represented that the policy provided '100 [percent] coverage . I . '.);
White v. Allstate Ins. Co., 513 F. Supp. 2d 674, 677 (E.D. La. 2007) ("Plaintiffs
further allege that Tarleton indicated that the hurricane coverage under their
homeowner's policy would cover any and all damages that might be incurred as
a result of a hurricane."); Cameron Parish Sch. Bd. v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 560 F. Supp. 2d 485, 487 (W.D. La. 2008) ("In its Complaint, CPSB
alleges that State Farm knew CPSB's flood insurance was insufficient, that State
Farm knew CPSB wanted to maximize its flood insurance, and that State Farm
did not tell CPSB additional flood insurance could be purchased outside of the
NFIA and with another company."); Smith v. Kert LeBlanc Ins. Agency, Inc.,
2008 WL 2308828, at *1 (E.D. La. 2008) ("Plaintiffs contend that they should
be paid more than their policy limits because State Farm did not advise them
upon renewal of their policy that the amount of their coverage would be
insufficient to completely rebuild their home following its destruction . . . .
Plaintiffs argue that they specifically desired and purchased a 'full replacement
policy."'); Martinonis v. Utica Natl. Ins. Group, 840 N.E.2d 994, 996 (Mass.
App. 2006) ("'I definitely brought up to him all of this information, and
questioned him and asked him and asked him whether it shouldn't be increased.
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large the burden of dispute resolution is. Many claims do not result in
litigation,"' and many litigation claims do not go to trial or become
reported appellate decisions.
II. A HISTORY OF LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO
INFORMATION INEFFICIENCIES IN INSURANCE TRANSACTIONS
Both of the inefficiencies identified above result from imperfect
information. Homeowners have less insurance than they expect when
they have imperfect information about valuation. Disputes arise when
the distribution of the risk of inaccurate valuation is unclear.
Expressed another way, when a homeowner purchases residential
property insurance, the determination of coverage, valuation, and
apportionment of risk (of either underinsurance or undervaluation) will
result in one of five scenarios:
(1) Homes with guaranteed replacement coverage.
(2) Homes with capped coverage that are correctly valued and have full
insurance.
(3) Homes with capped coverage that are correctly valued, are insured
for less than full value, and both insurer and homeowner are
adequately informed (A) that in the event of loss the coverage may
be less than the cost to rebuild, and (B) of the apportionment,
between insurer and homeowner, of responsibility for any shortfall
of coverage to fund rebuilding of the home.
(4) Homes with capped coverage that are correctly valued, are insured
for less than full value, and the homeowner (and perhaps the insurer)
is inadequately informed (A) that in the event of loss the coverage
may be less than the cost to rebuild, or (B) of the apportionment,
between insurer and homeowner, of responsibility for any shortfall
of coverage to fund rebuilding of the home.
And he reassured me that that should be adequate."'); Stevens v. Hickey-Finn &
Co., Inc., 261 A.D.2d 300, 300-01 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) ("Plaintiff requested
'proper and adequate' coverage . . . in response, the agent, as she had in prior
years, utilized a "Home Aestimator' computer program to check .... In the
aftermath of a fire at the insured premises, plaintiff discovered that, in fact, he
had been seriously underinsured . . . . "); Everett v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co.,
162 Cal. App. 4th 649, 656-58 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
" See David J. Nye & Donald G. Gifford, The Myth of the Liability Insurance
Claims Explosion: An Empirical Rebuttal, 41 VAND. L. REv. 909, 910 (1988).
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(5) Homes with capped coverage that are undervalued and the
homeowner (and perhaps the insurer) is inadequately informed (A)
that in the event of loss the coverage may be less than the cost to
rebuild, or (B) of the apportionment, between insurer and
homeowner, of responsibility for any shortfall of coverage to fund
rebuilding of the home.
Scenarios (1) and (2) do not lead to either of the inefficiencies
identified in this Article. Because scenario (3) only requires objectively,
not subjectively, adequate information, there may still be some instances
of either of the described inefficiencies, but the frequency and cost will
be greatly reduced. This Article thus targets scenarios (4) and (5).
The problem of clearly conveying information in insurance contracts
is not news."16 Legislatures and courts are no strangers to the problems
that flow from the difficulty consumers have in understanding their
insurance policies. Both institutions have tried to address the problem of
inadequate information through the jurisprudence of contracts.
Legislatures have adopted a variety of approaches to impose clarity
and disclosure on the purchase and sale of various insurance products.
For homeowners' insurance, the predominant tool of choice is the Flesch
Readability Index." 7
In 1948, Rudolph Flesch published a methodology to measure the
ease of understanding a statement written in English." 8 It is used by
numerous government agencies, including the United States Department
of Defense.1 9 In other words, the Flesch Readability Index, properly
applied, is a recognized metric of language clarity.
While in principle, the states' adoption of the Flesch readability
metric is a rational response to the lack of clarity in insurance
transactions, in practice the adoption falls short. Twenty-five states, as
well as the District of Columbia, require that at least some types of
insurance policies (most often, but not always, homeowners' policies)
116 See, e.g., Symposium, Introduction: The Insurance Law Doctrine of
Reasonable Expectations After Three Decades, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. I (1998).
11 New Mexico has a more general requirement of policy language
simplification. N.M. STAT. ANN. (1978) § 59A-19-4(A)(1). South Carolina
requires Flesch readability at a seventh grade reading level while Texas requires
a ninth grade reading level. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-4-105(B) (1976); 28 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE §3.3092(c)(2) (1997). Connecticut requires a particular font size.
CoNN. AGENCIES REGS. § 38a-430-2 (2009).
"8 Rudolf Flesch, A New Readability Yardstick, 32 J. APPL. PSYCH. 221 (1948).
119 Readability Formulas, The Flesch Reading Ease Readability Formula,
http://www.readabilityformulas.com/flesch-reading-ease-readability-
formula.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
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have a minimum "Flesch readability score" of either 40 or 45.120 Three
states require a Flesch readability score of at least 50.121 The Flesch
formula divides the ease of readability of language into the following
categories: Very Easy, Easy, Fairly Easy, Standard, Fairly Difficult,
Difficult, and Very Difficult. 122 Language is in the second lowest
category-Difficult-if it has a score between 30 and 49.123 In other
words, rather than utilize the Flesch metric to mandate readable
insurance policies, state legislatures use the metric to permit policies that
are at least "difficult" to understand-or, put another way, simply not
"very difficult."
The judicial response to insurance coverage disputes also approaches
the question from the premise that insurance policies are contracts, and
thus subject to traditional contract doctrines and tools to refine clarity. 12 4
Cases such as Everett illustrate the resulting problem of a traditional
contract analysis. State Farm asserted successfully that it had clearly and
effectively shifted risk.12 5 Yet MS. Everett plainly had not gotten that
message. And this is not simply because either she did not read her
policy or was too unsophisticated to understand it. Ms. Everett's
circumstances, and how State Farm dealt with them, resulted in a
sufficiently problematic legal outcome that the California Insurance
Commissioner supported de-publication of the Everett appellate
120 ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R20-6-210(C)(2) (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-80-
206(a)(1) (West 2010); 3 COLO. CODE REGS. § 702-4 (2011); D.C. Code § 31-
4725(a)(1) (2009); FLA, STAT. ANN. §627.4145(1)(a) (West 2009); GA. COMP.
R. & REGS. 120-2-42.04(g) (2009); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-13-16(b)(3) & 27-
1-26-3(1) (West 2009); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 191-28.14(2) (2009); 806 KY.
ADMIN. REGS. 14:121(5)(1) (2009); MD. CODE REGS. 31.10.02.02(A)(1) (2009);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72C.10(2)(a) (West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-
337(8) (West 2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-3405(1)(a) (2008); NEv. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 687B.124(1)(a) (West 2008); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:2-18.4(j)
(2009); N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 3102(c)(1)(D) (McKinney 2009); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 26.1-33-30(1)(a) (2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3902.04(A)(1) (West
2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3645(A)(1) (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 743.106(1)(a) (West 2009); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-1 1A-3(l) (2009);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-1605(a)(1) (West 2009); VT. ADMIN. CODE 4-3-10:6
(West 2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-233(G) (West 2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. §
33-29-5(a)(1) (West 2009); Wis. ADMIN. CODE INS. § 6.07(4)(a)(1) (2009). All
but two of these states-Florida and New York-set the threshold at 40, rather
than 45.
121 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2441(l)(A) (2009); 211 MA. CODE REGS.
71.04(1) (2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-38-30(b)(1) (West 2009).
122 Flesch, supra note 118, at 230.
123 id.
124 See, e.g., Pardee Constr. Co. v. Ins. Co. of the West, 77 Cal. App. 4th 1340,
1352 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
125 162 Cal. App. 4th at 654-63.
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decision. 126 Traditional contract doctrines left sufficient ambiguity, even
with State Farm's clause, for credible and costly litigation to ensue.
Special contract doctrines crafted to address insurance contracts in
particular have fared no better. For example, in 1970, the legendary
Robert Keeton proposed biasing the interpretation of contracts to favor
the reasonable expectations of the insured. 12 7 This approach was adopted
in some form by at least half of the states. 12 8 Under the doctrine, insureds
get the coverage they reasonably expect without regard to the verbiage
of the policy.12 9 Keeton saw it as a way to avoid precisely the kind of
problem this Article is addressing: after-the-fact surprises about the
sufficiency of coverage. 3 0 The doctrine grew out of the commonsense
but probably inaccurate notion that because insurance contracts could be
thought of as contracts of adhesion, normal market mechanisms to
encourage efficient contracting failed.131 As a matter of jurisprudence
and economics, the advisability of this approach has been debated.132
Most states, however, have used the doctrine in a far less aggressive
way, such as a proxy for ordinary contract principles.1 33 In any event, the
doctrine suffered from a host of problems in application.' 34 Today, few
states follow the rule, and the case law describing it is convoluted. 3 5
A second approach in the courts has been the special duty doctrine.
This approach starts from the premise that insurance is a contract just
126 June 25, 2008 Request of California Insurance Commissioner Steve Poizner
for Depublication of Everett v. State Farm General Ins. Co., 162 Cal. App. 4th
649 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
127 Keeton, supra note 103, at 966-77.
128 Steinberg v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 67, 77 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
129 Keeton, supra note 103; see, e.g., Buss v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 4th 35, 45
(Cal. 1997) ("To yield their meaning, the provisions of a policy must be
considered in their full context . . . . Where it is clear, the language must be read
accordingly . . . . Where it is not, it must be read . . . in the sense that satisfies
the insured's objectively reasonable expectations.").
130 Keeton, supra note 103, at 967-68.
131 Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1401-02.
132 See Mark C. Rahdert, Reasonable Expectations Reconsidered, 18 CONN. L.
REv. 323 (1986); Kenneth S. Abraham, Judge-Made Law and Judge-Made
Insurance: Honoring the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured, 67 VA. L.
REV. 1151 (1981); Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules:
Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361
(2009); David F. Travella, Are Insurance Policies Still Contracts?, 42
CREIGHTON L. REV. 157 (2009).
133 Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1427-28.
134 See, e.g., Abraham, supra note 132, at 1152 (arguing against the doctrine);
Symposium, The Insurance Law Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations After
Three Decades, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1998).
135 Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1395.
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like any other contract.1 3 6 Thus, because policy coverage limits are
explicitly set forth in the contract, the insurer and its representatives have
no general duty to make sure that the limits are adequate unless their
actions create a special relationship and duty to do so.137 Yet in the end,
this approach too was unsuccessful. As one writer summarized the point,
"the courts' fixation on the concepts of 'contract of adhesion' and
'bargaining disparity' has caused the judiciary to misidentify the
problem," which actually "is with information imbalance."138
III. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
Courts and legislatures have explored, without success, various
contract doctrines in order to address inadequate information in
insurance transactions. 13 9 The challenge is to identify a mechanism that
discloses information more effectively without unnecessarily impairing
the ability of competitors to compete. To address the inadequacy of
information in insurance transactions, courts and legislatures must
broaden the scope of inquiry beyond insurance contract jurisprudence.
A. METHODS OF CURING INFORMATION INADEQUACY
A variety of non-insurance consumer contracts mandate language,
font, and prominence of information within a contract, such as the
detailed disclosures and consents sometimes mandated in real estate
sales contracts.140 But as discussed above, there is little history of these
136 See, e.g., Bank of the West v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 4th 1254, 1264 (Cal.
1992) ("While insurance contracts have special features, they are still contracts
to which the ordinary rules of contractual interpretation apply.").
1" See, e.g., Stokes v. Harrell, 711 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Ark. 1986); Free v.
Republic Ins. Co., 8 Cal. App. 4th 1726, 1729-30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Filip v.
Block, 879 N.E.2d 1076, 1085-86 (Ind. 2008); Bichelmeyer Meats v. Atlantic
Ins. Co., 42 P.3d 1191, 1197 (Kans. App. 2001); Smith v. Kert LeBlanc Ins.
Agency Inc., 2008 WL 2308828, at *1-3 (E.D. La. 2008); Szelenyi v. Morse,
Payson & Noyes Ins., 594 A.2d 1092, 1094 (Maine 1991); Martinonis v. Utica
Natl. Ins. Grp., 65 Mass. App. Ct. 418, 420-21 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006); accord
White v. Allstate Ins. Co., 513 F. Supp. 2d 674, 683 (E.D. La. 2007); Sandbulte
v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Iowa 1984); Hill v.
Grandey, 321 A.2d 28, 34 (Vt. 1974).
James M. Fischer, Why Are Insurance Contracts Subject to Special Rules of
Interpretation? Text Versus Context, 24 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 995, 1047 (1992) (quoted
in Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1403).
139 See Schwarcz, supra note 15.
140 See Appendix C to this Article for an example of various clauses of real
estate contracts mandated under California law. For examples of such an
approach in other consumer contracts, see California regulations addressing
disclosure and risk arises in product tanning (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22701
et seq.), dating ad weight loss contracts (CAL. CIV. CODE § 1694.2), and
Sperm/Ova removal (CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2260). More broadly, see Alan
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approaches working in insurance contracts. 14 1 Just three of the problems
are the length of the contracts, the turgid language used, and the timing
142
of delivery of the written policy after the policy issues.
Recent scholarship suggests an alternative approach, which argues
for the entire abandonment of the predicate of insurance as contract. 14 3
One very familiar example of an extra-contractual approach to
information inadequacy is the product warning label on cigarettes. But,
of course, the cigarette label itself demonstrates that not all product
disclosure labels meet the goal of effectively and clearly disclosing
critical information without unnecessarily impairing the ability of
competitors to compete. Cigarette warnings labels, at least as configured
in the United States, do not clearly and effectively convey information to
consumers.144 While the Supreme Court has recognized that the labels do
provide some limited tort liability immunity, 14 5 some argue that the
labels' failure has promoted more litigation as a means of curbing
smoking. 146 Put another way, cigarette warning labels do not seem to
have ceased litigation nor clearly disclosed critical information.
Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract
Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387
(1983).
141 An anecdotal report of the ineffectiveness of such approaches is described in
Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Posner Admits He Didn't Read Boilerplate for
Home Equity Loan, ABA JOURNAL LAW NEWS Now (June 23, 2010),
http://www.abajournal.com/weekly/article/judgeposner-admits-he-didntread
boilerplate for home equityloan.
142 For a discussion of the intractability of crafting clear disclosures in complex
contracts, see Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A Cognitive and
Social Psychological Analysis of Disclosure Laws and Call For Mortgage
Counseling to Prevent Predatory Lending, 16 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & LAW 85, 96-
105 (2010).
143 See Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1434-62. A thoughtful discussion about the
intersection of insurance and contract law, and where Professor Schwarcz's
scholarship fits into that arc, is Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Insurance Policy As
Thing, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 813 (2009); see also Jeffrey W.
Stempel, The Insurance Policy as Social Instrument and Social Institution, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1489 (2010).
'4 D. Hammond, G. T. Fong, A. McNeill, R. Borland & K. M. Cummings,
Effectiveness of Cigarette Warning Labels in Informing Smokers about the Risks
of Smoking: Findings from the International Tobacco Control (ITC) Four
Country
Survey, 15 TOBACCO CONTROL (2006), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.go
v/pmc/articles/PMC2593056.
145 Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 505 U.S. 504, 520-21 (1992).
146 Graham E. Kelder, Jr. & Richard A. Daynard, The Role of Litigation in the
Effective Control of the Sale and Use of Tobacco, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 63
(1997).
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The relationship of cigarette warning labels to consumer behavior is
a highly nuanced and complex problem, and can be interpreted in a
variety of ways. The point simply is this: not all product warning labels
are of equal dignity or easily measured efficacy.
The approach this Article adapts is one already demonstrated as
effective:147 the EnergyGuide program promoting energy efficiency in
home appliances.14 8 The EnergyGuide program mandates the now
ubiquitous yellow label "to maintain uniformity for immediate consumer
recognition and readability." 4 9
B. A PROPOSAL TO CURE INFORMATIONINADEQUACYINHOMEOWNER'S
INSURANCE
The essential qualities of the EnergyGuide label are its clarity,
simplicity, and focus. Through simple text and reinforcing, intuitive
graphics, the EnergyGuide label conveys at a glance the relative energy
efficiency of an appliance within the group of similar appliances.150 At
the same time, the label in no way mandates how a manufacturer may
compete.
The exact same approach can be used for addressing the adequacy of
homeowner's insurance to cover a total loss. For purposes of clarity of
reference, the proposal of this Article will be referred to as the
"CoverageGuide" program. Here are the features of the proposal, all of
which would need to be incorporated into a regulatory scheme:
(1) Label. The first feature of the CoverageGuide program would be
a single page (8.5" x 11") yellow label that through simple text and an
intuitive graphic, conveys to the consumer (1) the relative amount of
147 See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY STAR AND OTHER CLIMATE
PROTECTION PARTNERSHIPS 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, 20-21, 26-27 (Dec. 2009);
accord 133 Cong. Rec. H881-01 (Mar. 3, 1987) (comments of Rep. Joe Barton)
("Experience shows that mandatory efficiency labels have successfully
encourage [sic] consumers to purchase efficient products. At the same time,
labels have allowed consumers the freedom of choice."); 59 Fed. Reg. 34,014 at
34,020-33; Appliance Labeling Rule, 72 Fed. Reg. 6836, 6838-41 (Feb. 13,
2007) (discussing results of FTC's consumer research); Transcript of FTC
Energy Labeling Public Workshop (May 3, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/comments/energylabeling-workshop/060503wrkshoptmsc
ript.pdf (recording approval of appliance labeling by representatives of
manufacturers Whirlpool and JVC); Robert F. Dyer & Thomas J. Maronick, An
Evaluation of Consumer Awareness and Use of Energy Labels in the Purchase
of Major Appliances: A Longitudinal Study, 7 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING
(SPECIAL ISSUE ON THE FTC) 83 (1988).
148 See 16 C.F.R. pt. 305, promulgated pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 6201 et seq.
149 16 C.F.R. § 305.11(a)(1).
s0 See 16 C.F.R. § 305.11(a)(5)(ii)(C).
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offered coverage under the proposed policy, compared to (2) the likely
amount of coverage necessary in the event of a total loss. In contrast to
the EnergyGuide label, this approach would add one additional, minor
level of complexity: the amount of money the consumer would have to
pay for the insurance at various levels. The text, of course, would be
mandated, both in terms of content, font, emphasis, and placement. 5 1
This label is intentionally designed to look just like the EnergyGuide
label. The label would look as follows:
151 For an example of how this is achieved in a regulation, see 16 C.F.R. §
305.11(a), which does precisely this for the EnergyGuide label.
JkWWW1OWM Xyz kWW Co.
rliWli "
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One of the key elements of this proposed label is that there is a
shared responsibility between insurer and insured. The homeowner bears
responsibility and risk in three ways. First, the homeowner is informed
that the amount of insurance the homeowner actually needs to rebuild in
the event of total loss is calculated "based on information you've
provided." Second, the homeowner is warned: ' If you
suffer a Total Loss of your home and the amount of Your Insurance is
less than the Amount needed to Rebuild, you would be responsible
for the difference in cost." Finally, the homeowner receives notice that
if the features of the coverage and deductibles actually purchased
change, then the cost of the insurance may also change.
(2) Timing. The notice to the homeowner describing the cost as
dependent upon the coverage and deductibles highlights a second
important feature of the proposed CoverageGuide program: timing. One
dilemma when purchasing insurance is that the policyholder may not get
the full copy of the policy (where, for example, the clause stating that the
amount of insurance is the homeowner's responsibility may reside) until
after the insurance is purchased and the initial premium is paid. The
proposed CoverageGuide program would require that the yellow page
"label" be the cover page of any quote for the purchase or renewal of
homeowners' insurance. This requirement eliminates any discussion of
whether the homeowner was adequately and timely informed of the level
of coverage.
(3) Guaranteed Replacement Insurance. The third feature of the
proposed CoverageGuide program is an approach to make sure the
methodology for the critical calculations-the cost of rebuilding the
home-provides the consumer with clear and adequate information
while preserving the ability of insurers to freely and vigorously compete
for customers. A homeowner's protection from loss is no better than the
accuracy of the calculation of the cost to rebuild the home. Yet an insurer
either may not wish to incur the cost of a comprehensive evaluation of
rebuild costs, or may have a preferred method of calculation that the
insurer considers to give it a competitive advantage. As Marshall &
Swift/Boeckh has comprehensively reported, however, there is not
unanimity in the methodology for calculating adequacy of coverage. 152
This then leads to the third feature of the proposed CoverageGuide
program: the insurer can use any methodology the insurer chooses;
however, if there is a total loss, and if the insurer's own methodology
results in inadequate insurance, then the policy shall be deemed as a
matter of law to be guaranteed replacement insurance. This leaves the
insurer to compete as the insurer chooses, but simultaneously protects
the homeowner against the insurer getting it wrong.
152 WELLS, supra note 8, at 18-59.
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(4) Mandatory Full Coverage Option. The fourth feature of the
program is a simple one: the insurer must provide at least one coverage
option that provides full coverage in the amount calculated by the insurer
as the actual cost to rebuild the home after a total loss. The homeowner
may not want this level of coverage, but by providing the option, the
insurer is insulated from the after-the-fact assertion that the homeowner
had no opportunity to fully insure the home for a total loss.
(5) Binding Features. The fifth feature of the program is intended to
insulate the homeowner from clauses in the full insurance policy that
undercut the CoverageGuide "label." The problem with the clause in the
Everett insurance policy was that the clause simultaneously put the risk
of inadequate insurance on the homeowner and gave the homeowner
incentive to not focus on the adequacy of coverage. Similar mischief can
be avoided under the CoverageGuide program by prohibiting the content
of the insurance policy to alter the first four features of the program-
most importantly, the fourth feature outlined immediately above.
(6) Presumption of Adequate Information. The final feature of the
program bars the homeowner from suing the insurer under the assertion
that the homeowner unintentionally had coverage that was inadequate in
amount. This is the converse of deeming the insurer as providing full
replacement coverage (the third feature). Here, if the insurer fully and
completely complies with all of the first five features of the program,
then the homeowner shall be deemed, as a matter of law, to have been
adequately informed of the amount of coverage.
IV. THE CASE FOR THE PROPOSAL
On its face, this program seeks to eliminate or at least reduce the
frequency of both identified inefficiencies in the homeowner insurance
market. Dispute costs will be reduced since litigation will be explicitly
banned. Information inadequacy will be reduced because of the clarity of
the disclosures.
Additionally, the program is designed to preserve competition. An
insurer essentially can do anything it wishes in setting price. Thus, the
program satisfies the goal of disclosing information more effectively
without unnecessarily impairing the ability of competitors to compete.
An EnergyGuide-like label for insurance has a variety of advantages.
First, unlike most approaches to remedying information imbalances in
consumer commercial information, there is data demonstrating that this
approach works. While legislatures and courts have explored any
number of other approaches-ranging from strict liability law to product
labeling to the doctrine of caveat emptor-virtually no data support the
effectiveness of any other approach.
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By mimicking the visual look of the EnergyGuide label, consumers
see a familiar form, which they immediately understand as providing
important information in a comparative format.1 13 The EnergyGuide
label is ubiquitous. Thus, even at a glance consumers recognize the
yellow label as conveying important information comparing potential
product choices. Utilizing this same aesthetic approach in insurance
transactions provides sufficient assurance that the purchaser either knew
or should have known about the adequacy of the insurance, making a bar
to litigation appropriate.
In turn, insurers are given something of immediate value-an
approach that insulates them from litigation. Put another way, a legislator
or regulator in the arena of insurance would recognize two public policy
gains: (1) the policy maker could have comfort in concluding that, in the
event of inadequate insurance to rebuild, the homeowner was in a bed of
their own making; and (2) at least in the particular context of the cost of
adequate homeowner's insurance, the policy maker would be insulated
from the argument of insurers, when seeking to raise rates, that the cost
of frivolous litigation was the primary driver.
The concern of insurance companies-the ability to compete on the
basis of price-also survives this regulatory approach. Insurance
companies can price insurance and even calculate rebuilding costs
however they wish. If a company wishes to bear some backend risk in
order to garner immediate market share, then that is completely
acceptable.
The combination of three factors-some risk shifting to the insured,
the bar on some kinds of litigation, and the protection of the insurer to
compete, price, and rate how the insurer chooses-should lessen
industry resistance to the proposal.
Finally, the proposed CoverageGuide "label" scores "fairly easy" to
understand under the Flesch Readability index.
V. THE CASE AGAINST THE PROPOSAL (AND A RESPONSE TO IT)
A prominent criticism of this proposal certainly will come from
insurers, who will assert that it fails to understand the nature of their
business. This criticism takes several forms, including that the proposal
does not recognize how an insurer needs to seamlessly renew policies 154
1 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENERGY STAR AND OTHER CLIMATE
PROTECTION PARTNERSHIPS 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, at 20-21, 26-27 (Dec.
2009).
154 Given that residential property insurance is placed as part of the purchase of a
house, and the premium frequently is built into the monthly mortgage payment,
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(in other words, not spend insurer time and customer time annually re-
evaluating value and coverage); and the proposal does not recognize how
hard, nuanced, uncertain, and expensive it can be for an insurer to
properly value a home.
These factors are, however, accounted for in this proposal. The
proposal first reflects a choice between two approaches: leaving the
valuation methodology up to the insurer, or imposing a methodology on
all insurers by regulatory fiat. The proposal rejects the fiat for two
reasons. First, a fiat strips insurers of one way in which they can
differentiate and compete with each other. Second, a fiat imposes an
untested model that might or might not be accurate. What the proposal
finds unacceptable is giving the insurer leeway to invest as much or as
little attention into valuation as the insurer wishes, but then allowing the
insurer to shift the risk of undervaluation to the homeowner. The insurer,
in order to remain in business, has to engage in some evaluation of the
risk it writes or indemnifies. The insurer should not be allowed to
internally undertake that evaluation, and nonetheless externally shift the
risk of error to its customer.'55 Thus, the proposal seeks to balance
interests between the insurer and insured by (1) giving the insurer both
the freedom to write and value risk as it wishes and a litigation shield
from insureds who purchase less coverage than actually necessary, but
(2) giving insureds protection through policy reformation should the
disclosed valuation be, in retrospect, inaccurate.' 56 Further, the insurer's
responsibility for undervaluation is tempered by the basing the valuation
on information provided by the homeowner.
Unspoken but inherent in industry criticism of the proposal will be
another concern: the CoverageGuide label sets a price or floor in claims-
adjusting negotiations. Put another way, clear and unambiguous rebuild
cost data cuts the legs out of a potential profit strategy of the insurer --
adjusting claims at below the actual per-square-foot price of
one would expect a material part of the business of residential property
insurance to be achieving high renewal persistency.
1 Insurers sometimes assert that the homeowner is best positioned to know the
value of the home. This may be an oblique reference to asymmetry of
information concerns that animate adverse selection. But insurers already have
to underwrite risk in the face of this asymmetry, and most profitably do so
without having an Everett-like firewall clause.
156 A potential problem arises in instances of mass loss, because scarcity can
distort per-square-foot construction costs. This can be dealt with, however, with
the sorts of riders now written, which give a percentage increase in coverage-
typically 25% or 50% if actual rebuild costs exceed caps. This "extended"
coverage, as it is called, is designed to address precisely these kinds of
scenarios. The "reformation" prong of the proposal is intended to calculate
rebuild costs in a non-scarcity market.
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rebuilding.' This is undoubtedly true. But it is a strength of the
proposal, not a weakness, if it truncates an unfair claims-handling
practice (intentionally offering a low settlement in recognition that many
insureds will undervalue their claim because of information imbalance
and emotional vulnerability in the immediate wake of loss).
A related criticism will be that this proposal fails to understand the
nature of homeowners purchasing insurance. This may take the form of
saying that homeowners will pay attention no more to this disclosure
than any other, and that insurance is moving away from paper
transactions. As to the latter concern, the disclosure can just as easily be
the first screen" of an e-commerce transaction as it can be the first page
of a paper transaction. As to the former concern, it is simply
unacceptable to bind insurers to a future of inevitable "inadequate
disclosure" litigation no matter how plain the disclosure; at some level of
disclosure the homeowner must take personal responsibility for the
homeowner's choices.
Another potential criticism of this proposal is that it is too specific.
According to this criticism, it is impossible to write the perfect contract,
and fixing one informational inadequacy in a complex contract
transaction is at best an incremental gain. But the rebuilding of a home
is, for most individuals, the single largest and most complex financial
transaction of their lives,159 and as discussed above, total loss claims
account for a disproportionate share of any actual losses from
underinsurance. If there is any single aspect of consumer insurance that
merits attention in isolation, then one could make a good case for it
being the total loss coverage provided in homeowners' insurance.
This proposal is incomplete for residents of areas that suffer a type
of total loss that insurance may or may not respond to (i.e. residents who
lost their homes to Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans), as the disclosure
form does not clarify the precise boundaries of coverage. To respond to
these critics: the more one tries to put on the form, the less effective it
15 For an extended, albeit non-neutral, discussion of the various incentives
insurers have to use the claims adjusting process as a profit opportunity, see JAY
M. FEINMAN, DELAY DENY DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON'T PAY
CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU CAN Do ABOUT IT (2010).
158 In light of the proliferation of, and variation in, ecommerce, a good
regulation will need to pay special attention to defining what is the "first
screen."
159 The only transaction which might rival rebuilding of a home would be the
original purchase of the same home. Because real estate as a general matter (and
over any time line of length) appreciates, and because new construction is both
more expensive and more complex than the purchase of an existing home, the
purchase of a home still is a smaller and materially less complex transaction.
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will be in conveying anything at all. Further, if one tried to use the
"Yellow label" approach for all aspects of consumer insurance, the
repetition of the solution would swallow up its efficacy. There will be a
breaking point somewhere, and insurance contracts long ago surpassed
the threshold of too much content to be assimilated by the ordinary
consumer.
Regulation, of course, is not the proper response to every single
problem. It is cogent to argue that mandatory rules regulating risk in
consumer contracts are necessary only when sellers' "incentives are
flawed by some market failure,"'160 but that is precisely the case here.
A concern with a proposal, such as this one, highlighting a particular
risk is that it minimizes the importance of all other risks.' 6' But this is
the single largest, and most consequential risk. Put another way, the cost
of not addressing this risk-leaving matters as they are-is too great.
Highlighting multiple risks would mimic the way insurance works right
now, attempting to convey so much that nothing is actually conveyed.
It might be argued that this proposal is politically impossible to
achieve. Insurers are famously resistant even to rational change.162
Campaign contributions do matter to elections,16 3 and insurers are
legendary campaign contributors.' 64 Consumer advocates undoubtedly
will argue that the insurance industry cannot be trusted to not carve up or
co-opt this proposal in the lawmaking process, thus changing it from one
of balance to one that hurts consumers. Free-floating fear of making a
bad situation worse, however, is not a basis to not try to make a bad
situation better. Offering insurers a litigation shield without impairing an
insurer's ability to compete should ameliorate much potential opposition.
One might argue that there is a simpler solution: a single regulation
straightforwardly mandating that all coverage be "guaranteed
replacement coverage." That most assuredly would work. But equally
assuredly, the industry would resist it fiercely, and likely ultimately
defeat it. After all, that was the market as it existed before 1994, which
the industry now has almost wholly abandoned as a business model.
Similarly, simply tightening current regulations to require insurance
contracts in their entirety to score "easy" on the Flesch readability index
160 Craswell, supra note 132, at 363.
161 Schwarcz, supra note 15, at 1433-34.
162 Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1106 (2006).
163 Jeffrey N. Sheff, The Myth of the Level Playing Field: Knowledge, Affect and
Repetition in Public Debate, 75 Mo. L. REV. 143, 150-57 (2010).
'6 Insurance: Long- Term Contribution Trends, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.
opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=F09 (last visited Apr. 1, 2011).
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would not work. A document of that length and complexity is incapable
of getting such a score on Flesch-indeed, that is precisely the problem.
Finally, and to an economist most damning, is the possibility that
requiring full insurance to be offered will increase the incidence of home
losses as a result of moral hazard. While this is a theoretical concern, it
demonstrably is a de minimus one. Here is why: According to census
data, in an average year, there are 30,000 total loss homes. Many of these
are lost in mass disasters, which obviously cannot be a loss due to moral
hazard, and many others are lost to non-insurable causes, such as flood.
So there are perhaps 20,000 total loss homes a year that might even
theoretically be homes lost because of moral hazard. Moral hazard arises
only to insured homes. Only 80% of homes are insured at all, so that gets
the set down to 16,000. Moral hazard concerns primarily arise if homes
are fully insured. Only roughly half of insured homes are fully insured.
That gets the set down to 8000 homes that could be a moral hazard loss.
As discussed earlier, there are reasons to question whether moral
hazard really accounts for any lost homes at all. For argument's sake,
assume some figure that you believe is actually too high, like 10%.
Assume that 10% of those 8000 homes would not have been lost but for
risks taken due to moral hazard. Now apply that to 2007, the year that
had the most losses of homes to disaster loss of any recent year of
record. In 2007, the average value of homes was $191,500. If moral
hazard causes the annual loss of 800 homes of an average value of
roughly $200,000, and which absent moral hazard would not have been
lost, then moral hazard causes insurers to experience an incurred loss
annually of $160,000,000. But, of course, insurers are in the actuary
business, and so they do not incur this loss, but rather pass it through in
premium.
So what is the "cost" of moral hazard, assuming it actually occurs in
residential insurance markets? In 2006, the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners calculated the average residential property
insurance premium as $801, across sixty million policies. 165 If
$160,000,000 is spread across 60,000,000 policies costing an average
premium of $801 each per year, moral hazard apparently would increase
this premium by about $2.67 per policy per year, or put another way, a
premium increase of roughly one-third of one percent. In summary,
while "moral hazard" is a frequent (and sometimes legitimate) concern
in evaluating proposals to more effectively spread risk, here it is so
demonstrably de minimus that it should not factor into an analysis.
165 2006 Dwelling Fire, Homeowners Owner-Occupied, and Homeowners
Tenant and Condominium/Cooperative Unit Owner's Insurance Report,
NAIC, 34 tbl.4, http://www.naic.org/documents/research stats-homeowners-sa
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CONCLUSION
While it may initially seem odd to treat the purchase of home
insurance the same as buying a washer dryer, it is an acceptable solution
to address information inadequacy in the insurance markets. The current
market structure promotes inefficiencies that are entirely avoidable, and
morally dubious. Put another way, the current marketplace is not
structured in a way where we would expect consensus that underinsured
homeowners like Ms. Everett brought financial ruin on themselves. An
approach that eliminates inefficiencies, preserves free competition, and
provides confidence that homeowners know what they are buying should
be embraced.
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APPENDIX A
California:1 66
5. Property Insurance. Borrower shall keep the improvements now
existing or hereafter erected on the Property insured against loss by fire,
hazards included within the term "extended coverage," and any other
hazards including, but not limited to, earthquakes and floods, for which
Lender requires insurance. This insurance shall be maintained in the
amounts (including deductible levels) and for the periods that Lender
requires. What Lender requires pursuant to the preceding sentences can
change during the term of the Loan. The insurance carrier providing the
insurance shall be chosen by Borrower subject to Lender's right to
disapprove Borrower's choice, which right shall not be exercised
unreasonably. Lender may require Borrower to pay, in connection with
this Loan, either: (a) a one-time charge for flood zone determination,
certification and tracking services; or (b) a one-time charge for flood
zone determination and certification services and subsequent charges
each time remappings or similar changes occur which reasonably might
affect such determination or certification. Borrower shall also be
responsible for the payment of any fees imposed by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency in connection with the review of any
flood zone determination resulting from an objection by Borrower.
If Borrower fails to maintain any of the coverages described above,
Lender may obtain insurance coverage, at Lender's option and
Borrower's expense. Lender is under no obligation to purchase any
particular type or amount of coverage. Therefore, such coverage shall
cover Lender, but might or might not protect Borrower, Borrower's
equity in the Property, or the contents of the Property, against any risk,
hazard or liability and might provide greater or lesser coverage than was
previously in effect. Borrower acknowledges that the cost of the
insurance coverage so obtained might significantly exceed the cost of
insurance that Borrower could have obtained. Any amounts disbursed by
Lender under this Section 5 shall become additional debt of Borrower
secured by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at
the Note rate from the date of disbursement and shall be payable, with
such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment.
All insurance policies required by Lender and renewals of such
policies shall be subject to Lender's right to disapprove such policies,
shall include a standard mortgage clause, and shall name Lender as
mortgagee and/or as an additional loss payee and Borrower further
166 California Security Instrument Form 3005: Word, EFANNIEMAE.COM,
https://www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/secinstruments/doc/3005
w.doc.
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agrees to generally assign rights to insurance proceeds to the holder of
the Note up to the amount of the outstanding loan balance. Lender shall
have the right to hold the policies and renewal certificates. If Lender
requires, Borrower shall promptly give to Lender all receipts of paid
premiums and renewal notices. If Borrower obtains any form of
insurance coverage, not otherwise required by Lender, for damage to, or
destruction of, the Property, such policy shall include a standard
mortgage clause and shall name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an
additional loss payee and Borrower further agrees to generally assign
rights to insurance proceeds to the holder of the Note up to the amount of
the outstanding loan balance.
In the event of loss, Borrower shall give prompt notice to the
insurance carrier and Lender. Lender may make proof of loss if not made
promptly by Borrower. Unless Lender and Borrower otherwise agree in
writing, any insurance proceeds, whether or not the underlying insurance
was required by Lender, shall be applied to restoration or repair of the
Property, if the restoration or repair is economically feasible and
Lender's security is not lessened. During such repair and restoration
period, Lender shall have the right to hold such insurance proceeds until
Lender has had an opportunity to inspect such Property to ensure the
work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction, provided that such
inspection shall be undertaken promptly. Lender may disburse proceeds
for the repairs and restoration in a single payment or in a series of
progress payments as the work is completed. Unless an agreement is
made in writing or Applicable Law requires interest to be paid on such
insurance proceeds, Lender shall not be required to pay Borrower any
interest or earnings on such proceeds. Fees for public adjusters, or other
third parties, retained by Borrower shall not be paid out of the insurance
proceeds and shall be the sole obligation of Borrower. If the restoration
or repair is not economically feasible or Lender's security would be
lessened, the insurance proceeds shall be applied to the sums secured by
this Security Instrument, whether or not then due, with the excess, if any,
paid to Borrower. Such insurance proceeds shall be applied in the order
provided for in Section 2.
If Borrower abandons the Property, Lender may file, negotiate and
settle any available insurance claim and related matters. If Borrower
does not respond within 30 days to a notice from Lender that the
insurance carrier has offered to settle a claim, then Lender may negotiate
and settle the claim. The 30-day period will begin when the notice is
given. In either event, or if Lender acquires the Property under Section
22 or otherwise, Borrower hereby assigns to Lender (a) Borrower's
rights to any insurance proceeds in an amount not to exceed the amounts
unpaid under the Note or this Security Instrument, and (b) any other of
Borrower's rights (other than the right to any refund of unearned
premiums paid by Borrower) under all insurance policies covering the
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Property, insofar as such rights are applicable to the coverage of the
Property. Lender may use the insurance proceeds either to repair or
restore the Property or to pay amounts unpaid under the Note or this
Security Instrument, whether or not then due.
New York: 16 7
5. Borrower's Obligation to Maintain Hazard Insurance or
Property Insurance. I will obtain hazard or property insurance to cover
all buildings and other improvements that now are, or in the future will
be, located on the Property. The insurance will cover loss or damage
caused by fire, hazards normally covered by "Extended Coverage"
hazard insurance policies, and any other hazards for which Lender
requires coverage, including, but not limited to earthquakes and floods.
The insurance will be in the amounts (including, but not limited to,
deductible levels) and for the periods of time required by Lender. What
Lender requires under the last sentence can change during the term of the
Loan. I may choose the insurance company, but my choice is subject to
Lender's right to disapprove. Lender may not disapprove my choice
unless the disapproval is reasonable. Lender may require me to pay
either (a) a one-time charge for flood zone determination, certification
and tracking services, or (b) a one-time charge for flood zone
determination and certification services and subsequent charges each
time remappings or similar changes occur which reasonably might affect
the flood zone determination or certification. If I disagree with the flood
zone determination, I may request the Federal Emergency Management
Agency to review the flood zone determination and I promise to pay any
fees charged by the Federal Emergency Management Agency for its
review.
If I fail to maintain any of the insurance coverages described above,
Lender may obtain insurance coverage, at Lender's option and my
expense. Lender is under no obligation to purchase any particular type or
amount of coverage. Therefore, such coverage will cover Lender, but
might or might not protect me, my equity in the Property, or the contents
of the Property, against any risk, hazard or liability and might provide
greater or lesser coverage than was previously in effect. I acknowledge
that the cost of the insurance coverage so obtained might significantly
exceed the cost of insurance that I could have obtained. Any amounts
disbursed by Lender under this Section 5 will become my additional debt
secured by this Security Instrument. These amounts will bear interest at
the interest rate set forth in the Note from the date of disbursement and
will be payable with such interest, upon notice from Lender to me
requesting payment.
16 7 New York Security Instrument Form 3033: Word, EFANNIEMAE.COM, https://
www.efanniemae.com/sf/formsdocs/documents/secinstruments/doc/3033w.doc.
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All of the insurance policies and renewals of those policies will
include what is known as a "Standard Mortgage Clause" to protect
Lender and will name Lender as mortgagee and/or as an additional loss
payee. The form of all policies and renewals will be acceptable to
Lender. Lender will have the right to hold the policies and renewal
certificates. If Lender requires, I will promptly give Lender all receipts
of paid premiums and renewal notices that I receive.
If I obtain any form of insurance coverage, not otherwise required by
Lender, for damage to, or destruction of, the Property, such policy will
include a Standard Mortgage Clause and will name Lender as mortgagee
and/or as an additional loss payee.
If there is a loss or damage to the Property, I will promptly notify the
insurance company and Lender. If I do not promptly prove to the
insurance company that the loss or damage occurred, then Lender may
do so.
The amount paid by the insurance company for loss or damage to the
Property is called "Insurance Proceeds." Unless Lender and I otherwise
agree in writing, any Insurance Proceeds, whether or not the underlying
insurance was required by Lender, will be used to repair or to restore the
damaged Property unless: (a) it is not economically feasible to make the
repairs or restoration; (b) the use of the Insurance Proceeds for that
purpose would lessen the protection given to Lender by this Security
Instrument; or (c) Lender and I have agreed in writing not to use the
Insurance Proceeds for that purpose. During the period that any repairs
or restorations are being made, Lender may hold any Insurance Proceeds
until it has had an opportunity to inspect the Property to verify that the
repair work has been completed to Lender's satisfaction. However, this
inspection will be done promptly. Lender may make payments for the
repairs and restorations in a single payment or in a series of progress
payments as the work is completed. Unless Lender and I agree otherwise
in writing or unless Applicable Law requires otherwise, Lender is not
required to pay me any interest or earnings on the Insurance Proceeds. I
will pay for any public adjusters or other third parties that I hire, and
their fees will not be paid out of the Insurance Proceeds. If the repair or
restoration is not economically feasible or if it would lessen Lender's
protection under this Security Instrument, then the Insurance Proceeds
will be used to reduce the amount that I owe to Lender under this
Security Instrument. Such Insurance Proceeds will be applied in the
order provided for in Section 2. If any of the Insurance Proceeds remain
after the amount that I owe to Lender has been paid in full, the remaining
Insurance Proceeds will be paid to me.
If I abandon the Property, Lender may file, negotiate and settle any
available insurance claim and related matters. If I do not answer, within
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30 days, a notice from Lender stating that the insurance company has
offered to settle a claim, Lender may negotiate and settle the claim. The
30-day period will begin when the notice is given. In either event, or if
Lender acquires the Property under Section 22 of this Security
Instrument or otherwise, I give Lender my rights to any Insurance
Proceeds in an amount not greater than the amounts unpaid under the
Note and this Security Instrument. I also give Lender any other of my
rights (other than the right to any refund of unearned premiums that I
paid) under all insurance policies covering the Property, if the rights are
applicable to the coverage of the Property. Lender may use the Insurance
Proceeds either to repair or restore the Property or to pay amounts
unpaid under the Note or this Security Instrument, whether or not then
due.
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APPENDIX C
18) LIQUIDATED DAMAGES: By placing their initials
immediately below, Buyer and Seller agree that it would be
impracticable or extremely difficult to fix actual damages in the
event of a default by Buyer, that the amount of Buyer's Deposit
hereunder (as same may be increased by the terms hereof) is the
parties' reasonable estimate of Seller's damages in the event of
Buyer's default, and that upon Buyer's default in its purchase
obligations under this agreement, not caused by any breach by
Seller, Seller shall be released from its obligations to sell the
Property and shall retain Buyer's Deposit (as same may be
increased by the terms hereof) as liquidated damages, which shall
be Seller's sole and exclusive remedy in law or at equity for
Buyer's default.
Buyer's Initials Seller's Initials
31) ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES: If a controversy arises with
respect to the subject matter of this Purchase Agreement or the
transaction contemplated herein (including but not limited to the
parties' rights to the Deposit or the payment of commissions as
provided herein), Buyer, Seller and Agent agree that such
controversy shall be settled by final, binding arbitration in
accordance with the Commercial Arbitration Rules of the
American Arbitration Association, and judgment upon the award
rendered by the arbitrator(s) may be entered in any court havingjurisdiction thereof.
NOTICE: BY INITIALING IN THE SPACE BELOW YOU ARE AGREEING TO
HAVE ANY DISPUTE ARISING OUT OF THE MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE
"ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES" PROVISION DECIDED BY NEUTRAL
ARBITRATION AS PROVIDED BY CALIFORNIA LAW AND YOU ARE GIVING
UP ANY RIGHTS YOU MIGHT POSSESS TO HAVE THE DISPUTE LITIGATED
IN COURT OR JURY TRIAL. BY INITIALING IN THE SPACE BELOW YOU
ARE GIVING UP YOUR JUDICIAL RIGHTS TO DISCOVERY AND APPEAL,
UNLESS SUCH RIGHTS ARE SPECIFICALLY INCLUDED IN THE
"ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES" PROVISION. IF YOU REFUSE TO SUBMIT
TO ARBITRATION AFTER AGREEING TO THIS PROVISION, YOU MAY BE
COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE
CALIFORNIA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. YOUR AGREEMENT TO THIS
ARBITRATION PROVISION IS VOLUNTARY.
WE HAVE READ AND UNDERSTAND THE FOREGOING AND AGREE TO
SUBMIT DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE MATTERS INCLUDED IN THE
"ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES" PROVISION TO NEUTRAL ARBITRATION.
Buyer's Initials Seller's Initials
Buyer's Agent's Initials Seller's Agent's Initials
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